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Abstract
Following an agency theoretic approach, this study sets out to investigate how banking 
institutions in Kenya are governed, using primarily semi-structured interview data. The 
study is incentivised by inadequate research on corporate governance of financial 
institutions within emerging economies. Accordingly, the study adopts an exploratory 
research design seeking to understand how governance is perceived and practiced within 
banks, together with the impact of corporate governance on performance of the Kenyan 
banking industry. The findings suggest that corporate governance is perceived differently 
within various banking institutions. It also emerges that corporate governance is practised 
along four broad lines within banks in Kenya: (a) board governance; (b) influences from 
global stage; (c) auditing; (d) shareholders. The results also reveal that corporate 
governance as considered by participants, boosts the performance of the Kenyan banking 
industry along three performance yardsticks: (a) going concern value; (b) cost-income 
ratio; (c) return on earnings. The results evidence some differences between the local 
institutional characteristics and assumptions founding the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model adopted in Kenya; where banks with concentrated ownership exhibit 
mainly principal-principal conflicts rather than principal-agent problems. The study 
recommends two mandatory independent audits -  half-year and end-year audits, in order to 
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AGM - Annual General Meeting
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This chapter describes the contextual background of Kenya’s capital market and the 
banking industry, and an overview of corporate governance in Kenya. It then describes the 
problem statement and research objectives, followed by a list of research questions guiding 
the research. The chapter concludes by explaining on the aim of the research and layout of 
the dissertation.
1.1 Background Information about Kenya
This study is situated in Kenya, which makes an interesting context for research because 
the country has initiated necessary features to support corporate governance [hereafter 
CG], specifically matching those within developed countries e.g. formation of capital 
market regulatory institutions, implementation of international CG principles, 
establishment of investor arbitration mechanisms (Musikali, 2008). Although Kenya and 
the larger sub-Saharan African region recently introduced reforms aimed at improving 
investor protection and ‘good’ CG, the East African countries including Kenya were found 
to have weak investor protection and disclosure requirements rated by the IMF at 4.0 and 
3.8 respectively (on a scale of 1 weakest and 10 strongest). This performance is 
disappointing particularly when compared to OECD countries that stand at an average of 
6.0. The IMF thus recommended strict regulations of disclosure and related-party 
transactions, to enhance transparency and protection of shareholders. The organisation also 
recommends stiff penalties when directors abuse the CG process (IMF/World Bank, 2011). 
This is attributed to challenges that Kenya and other sub-Saharan African countries endure 
including corruption, poverty, political tensions and weak institutions (Kisiangani, 2012)
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which hamper the effective implementation of CG. This research is timely given that 
Kenya recently launched a development programme, Kenya Vision 2030, which seeks to 
transform the country into middle-income economy. The government has expressed 
intention to exploit the financial services sector to fund the programme, and also attract 
more foreign direct investments to contribute to wealth creation and boost economic 
growth (Kenya Vision 2030, 2011). This study contributes to Kenya’s development 
strategy by looking on ways of enhancing investor confidence, through improved CG in 
the management of banking institutions.
1.2 Background of the Kenyan Banking Industry
An outline of the background of banking industry in Kenya, which also forms the subject 
of this inquiry, is provided in appendix 1. In addition, major provisions contained within 
the Kenyan CG code are explained in appendix 2.
1.3 Statement of the Problem
This research purposes to investigate how CG practitioners within Kenyan banks perceive 
and practice CG, together with how this influences bank financial performance. This 
approach deviates from majority of preceding quantitative work which despite offering 
ability to make predictions and generalise findings, has continuously yielded mixed results, 
prompting an alternative inquiry into the subject, to allow for in-depth investigation. 
Overall, the scarcity of CG investigation on banks in Africa, coupled with a need to expand 
CG research through qualitative approach has spurred the interest in this study.
This research attempts to provide an explanation as to why CG may be seen as a necessary 
process within banks, as well as gauge senior managements CG actions as described 
against what is explained in the annual reports. It also evaluates the impact of existing CG 
guidelines on bank financial performance and eventual shareholder wealth. The study 
adopts agency theory in interpreting the research data, as discussed in the next chapter. To
10
my best of knowledge, no prior research has qualitatively investigated the CG of banking 
institutions in Kenya.
1.4 Research Objectives
i. Identify perceptions of senior bank executives regarding the role of corporate 
governance within their banks.
ii. Explore ways in which bank executives practice corporate governance based on their 
understanding of the corporate governance process.
iii. Understand ways in which corporate governance influences bank financial 
performance.
1.4.1 Main Research Question
How do bank executives in Kenya practice corporate governance, and how does this 
impact on the banking industry’s performance?
1.4.2 Research Sub-Questions
i. How do bank executives perceive the process of corporate governance 
implementation?
ii. How is corporate governance practised within Kenyan banks?
iii. How does compliance with corporate governance guidelines impact on performance of 
banking industry in Kenya?
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1.5 Layout of Dissertation
The organisation of this research is as follows: Chapter one presents an overview of the 
research, together with aims and objectives guiding the investigation. Chapter two provides 
a literature review, identifying gaps which help in generating the research questions listed 
in chapter one. Chapter two also appraises the theoretical lens adopted, and acknowledges 
other theories that were rejected. Chapter three accounts for the data collection methods 
selected, and the basis on which they were preferred over other data collection methods. 
Chapter four provides details data collection with participants. It also outlines the 
systematized approach to data analysis, from collection to interpretation. Chapter five 
delivers interpretation of the findings, relative to the research questions. Chapter six 





This literature review seeks to justify the appropriateness of an agency approach in 
pursuing the research, and position the study within contemporary argument. The themes 
discussed in this literature review were informed by a literature mapping of key 
publications around the topic area (see Appendix 7). The first section discusses the 
meaning of CG and a rationalization of the theoretical approach adopted. The second 
section discusses the interaction between CG and banking institutions. The third section 
reviews the status of CG research in the African context. The fourth section outlines the 
role of banking in Africa’s economic landscape. The fifth section reviews empirical work 
on the influence of CG on bank financial performance.
2.1 Conceptual Framework
CG is broadly defined as the way in which corporations are directed and controlled 
(Cadbury Report, 1992). However, CG has different meanings within various theoretical 
standpoints that influence researchers. The shareholder-focussed agency theory, perceives 
CG as structures through which suppliers of capital in a corporation are assured reasonable 
returns on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Proposed as an alternative view to 
agency approach, stakeholder theory defines CG as a “process by which corporations are 
made responsive to the rights and wishes of stakeholders” including employees, creditors, 
shareholders, and government (Demb and Neubauer, 1992, p.9). Furthermore, the 
resource-based view argues that CG should focus on the competitive advantage emanating 
from expertise and skills that board directors, particularly non-executive directors bring a 
company instead of over-emphasizing on monitoring them (Short et al., 1999).
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Specifically this study gives attention to agency perspective, which posits that a firm 
embodies contracts between the shareholders (principals) as providers of economic 
resources, and managers (agents) who are trusted with controlling those resources to 
maximize value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This theory addresses the agency problem 
which arises when “decision making authority is delegated by principals to agents, and the 
agents use that power to promote their own well-being; which may not be in the best 
interests of principals” (Band, 1992, p.454). Although agency research has been the most 
popular paradigm within CG studies (Arun and Turner, 2004), this theory has attracted 
heavy criticism from writers as Hirsch and Friedman, 1986 (cited in Eisenhardt, 1989, 
p.57) who claimed that it is narrow and fails to address any clear problems; while Fehr and 
Falk (2002) argue that it does not account for any existing trust and cooperation between 
principals and agents. Nevertheless, Band (1992) contends that agency theory has been 
able to address a fundamental issue - agency problem within corporations, which 
conventional theories have not addressed sufficiently. Also, Eisenhardt (1989, p.72) 
emphasize that “agency theory provides a unique, realistic and empirically testable 
perspective, on problems of cooperative effort”, by offering “richer and more meaningful 
research” (Adams, 1994, p. 11) in understanding “complexities of ensuring contracted 
agents’ accountability” (Lambright, 2008, p.223).
The researcher believes that agency theory is potentially helpful in understanding the CG 
situation within Kenyan banks, because of the following factors. Firstly, the institutional 
environment shaping the implementation of CG is Anglo-American in nature, which 
Kholeif (2008) argues as embodying agency problems, articulated through conflict of 
interest between shareholders and managers. Secondly, the potential for agency conflicts is 
high within Kenyan banks given the mandatory requirement for ‘adequate professional 
competence and experience’ demanded for senior bank executives under the Kenya 
Banking Act (2011). To comply, bank owners are compelled to recruit non-owner
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professionals to manage their institutions thereby exacerbating the likelihood of agency 
issues (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The suitability of agency theory as a basis for 
pursuing the research is further informed by Ahunwan’s (2002) observation that, agency 
problems are likely to be common in developing countries such as Kenya, due to weak 
capital markets, existence of information asymmetry and inadequate judicial systems. By 
employing an agency theoretic lens, this study seeks to understand in depth how bank 
executives within Kenyan banks perceive the role of CG, and implement the CG code, 
along with how CG impacts on banking industry performance and realization of increased 
shareholder value. The study will also make potential contribution to the assumptions of 
agency theory in emerging countries.
2,2 Corporate Governance and Banking Institutions
While arguing for strong CG regulations in banks, compared to other non-financial firms, 
Macey and O’Hara (2003) noted that banking firms are unique institutions because of their 
liquidity production role, potential for conflict of interests between fixed and equity 
claimants, and an overly liquid asset structure. Zulkafli and Samad (2007) further noted 
that banks operate under strict regulatory environment compared to non-financial firms, 
since bank operations are encompassed by numerous moral hazard and information 
asymmetry issues. They cited the opaque nature of bank operations, and likelihood of 
insiders to allocate themselves credit as avenues which shareholder value may be 
compromised. Zulkafli and Samad (2007) maintain that banks require extra policing 
through effective CG systems, to supplement regulation, claiming that private investors 
too, have a role to play in promoting CG and easing pressure on government-backed 
regulations.
As Reaz and Arun (2006) argue, regulators primarily focus on protecting the financial
system and give little attention to shareholders’ interests. Andres and Vallelado (2008,
p.2570) also maintain that, although increased regulation “can be considered as an
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additional mechanism of CG”, it imposes bank-ownership controls and restricts banks 
operations, thereby potentially conflicting with shareholders goal of increasing equity 
returns. Andres and Vallelado further concluded that, while strong banking regulation is 
crucial for maintaining a sound financial system, it also reduces the effectiveness of CG 
mechanisms in dealing with CG problems, i.e. if a regulator’s primary objective is to 
control for systemic risk, there may be conflicts with shareholders expectations of 
increased share returns. It would therefore be interesting to listen to bank executives’ 
experiences in practising CG, together with considerations of how they go about balancing 
between the shareholders’ interests and regulatory demands. This might help to understand 
motivations for any selective compliance with the code.
Conversely, Hagendorff et al. (2010) examined the effectiveness of three board monitoring 
mechanisms: independence, CEO-chair duality, and diversity under different regulatory 
environments and established that these board characteristics were negligible in affecting 
bank performance in less-strict regulatory regimes, as they could not prevent value- 
destroying strategies. These writers’ found board independence and effectiveness to 
improve shareholder gains within strict regimes. Hagendorff et al. (2010) thereafter 
concluded that CG mechanisms and bank regulation are not substitutes, but 
complementary, and called for strict bank regulation for effective board monitoring and 
increased shareholder value. The findings from this research will ascertain whether 
Hagendorff et al.’s (2010) argument holds for Kenya. Seemingly, banks benefit from 
industry regulation in ensuring stability through stem measures and rigorous risk-checks. 
Accordingly, this study attempts to establish whether obligatory banking regulations in 
Kenya, deviate from shareholders expectations.
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2.3 Corporate Governance in Africa
Amid rising global competition, Africa continually strives to appeal to foreign investors as 
a worthy investment destination, and Okpara (2011, p. 184) calls for African countries to 
foster effective CG that promotes “managerial excellence and help firms to raise capital 
and attract foreign investors”. This pursuit of the ‘right’ CG standards has seen many 
developing countries rush to adopt CG codes that have been designed in developed 
countries, while others have given in to pressure from international donors who impose CG 
reforms in exchange for aid (Tsamenyi and Uddin, 2008). Kenya, for instance, officially 
endorsed a CG code in 2002 that borrowed heavily from the Anglo-American CG model 
(Musikali, 2008). However, insofar as these reforms were a way of pleasing international 
donors, their adoption brought hope that a poorly performing African corporate sector was 
finally rescued. Nonetheless, emerging evidence (Tsamenyi and Uddin, 2008; Wanyama et 
al., 2009) continues to cast doubt on effectiveness of CG systems in Africa. For instance in 
Ghana, Adu-Amoah et al. (2008) established that CG systems were ineffective for having 
overlooked the unique socio-political context of that country. These authors reported huge 
differences between actual and idealized benefits, and suggested a re-design of CG 
regulations within developing countries. They argued for African countries to move 
beyond ‘western’ systems of governance, and factor for peculiarity of local institutional 
environment -  socio-political factors -  should they desire to achieve effective1 CG. 
Tsamenyi and Uddin (2008, p. 10) also maintained that developing countries contexts are 
“dynamic and problematic”, due to their socio-cultural and political contexts that have the 
potential to hinder the effectiveness of imported CG models. Additionally, while agency 
perspective articulates CG problems as arising from principal-agent conflicts, this research 
recognises likelihood of principal-principal conflicts within privately-held banks where 
ownership structures comprise large controlling shareholders, usually the founders and
1 CG is deemed as effective when its implementation achieves the desired outcomes, for instance, here board 
appointees serve to protect shareholders interests rather than for financial or other payments deriving from 
holding such role (Reaz and Arun, 2006).
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minority shareholders (Chen et al., 2011). Whereas these studies largely focus on 
shortcomings of ‘imported’ CG codes within African countries, this research seeks to 
understand how Kenyan banks adapt to local institutional environment in implementing 
CG. This section relates to the second research question which seeks to explore how CG is 
practised in banks in Kenya.
2.4 Banking in Africa
Banks in developing countries are vital for economic progress as financial markets are 
typically underdeveloped, and they consequently occupy dominant position being the chief 
payment systems (King and Levine, 1993). Therefore, ‘good’ CG practices are argued to 
have wider implications on the overall economic development of developing economies 
(Reaz and Arun, 2006; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2012). Arun and Turner (2004, p.371) call 
for stronger bank governance mechanisms after observing that “many developing 
economies have recently liberalised their banking systems through 
privatisation/disinvestments”. The writers argue that managers of these banks have 
subsequently acquired a lot of freedom in the way they run their banks, and need to be 
monitored for any excessive behaviour. Arun and Turner (2004) recommended that 
developing-countries governments, partially open-up their banking sectors to foreign banks 
to increase competition and subsequently impart ‘good’ CG on domestic banks. They also 
suggested that bank managers of privatised banks be gradually introduced to CG practices 
before divestment. In this respect Kenya, as with other African countries, has had heavy 
government participation within the banking sector, where government controls substantial 
stake within the banking industry. Moreover, Kenya’s banking industry dominates the 
financial sector, as the main provider of finance to the economy as the capital markets are 
still in their formative stages (Ngugi et al., 2009). This research is also a rejoinder to Roe 
and Peachey (2008, p. 10) observation that “attention given by Kenyan research community 
to banking issues, and analysis of voluminous amount of banking data already available is 
disappointing”.
18
2.5 Corporate Governance of Banks in Africa
Despite few research attempts examining the influence of CG on firm performance, 
Tsamenyi and Uddin (2008) maintain that there is still a shortage of rigorous CG studies 
within the African context. Similarly, the African Development Bank (ADB) continues to 
encourage CG reforms within member countries in addressing weaknesses emanating from 
weak economic and political systems. Recently, ADB formulated a strategic plan 
encouraging African banks compliance with CG, with an intention to demand full 
compliance for financial support. ADB issued a CG Policy in 2007, highlighting the 
urgency for financial institutions to embrace strong CG practices for managerial 
excellence, and also for occupying a “key leverage point for mainstreaming CG across 
other sectors of the economy” when they lend (ADB, 2007, p.6). ADB further noted that 
adoption of ‘good’ CG principles would help curtail banks from irregularly giving credit 
based on familial and social networks, thus avoiding risks of defaults that impair 
performance.
This is particularly opportune because Kenya has in the past experienced a spate of bank 
failures due to mismanagement and excessive insider lending, which led to collapse of 23 
financial institutions between 1984 and 1996 (Waiguchu et al., 1999, p.343). The writers 
mainly underscore non-compliance to basic management principles, and, poor lending 
practices as the genesis of those banking troubles. Nonetheless, Kenya was cited by ADB 
(2007) as having made reasonable progress in promoting CG, making it an interesting case 
to examine the influence of CG developments on bank performance.
Aboagye and Otieku (2010), in a study on Ghana also noted that between 1976 and 2007,
twenty-three banks collapsed although their capital base was higher than 8% recommended
by Basel Committee. They attributed the problem to ‘bad’ CG practices within banks,
backing a previous Ghanaian central bank report that management incompetence, along
with improper accounting practices was the main cause of failure. These researchers later
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analysed effects of ownership structures and management attributes on performance, and 
established neutral association between CG and financial performance. They however 
emphasized need for the bank owners’ to place particular importance on development of 
board and managerial competencies.
In Uganda, Matama (2008) discussed the significance of CG on bank performance, and 
claimed that CG contributes over 30% of total bank performance. CG was gauged by 
mechanisms of financial transparency, disclosure and trust, which were regressed against 
financial performance as expressed by capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings and 
liquidity. The author found trust which represented openness and reliability to be the most 
significant contributor of financial performance; while credit risk disclosure was the only 
variable found to have negative influence on banks’ earnings. Matama (2008) argued that 
banks should maintain ‘proper’ governance practices particularly disclosure and 
transparency which help to build trust with stakeholders including shareholders, and boost 
firm value. Similarly, Reaz and Arun (2006) earlier claimed that transparency associated 
with disclosure of financial information, is particularly important in assuring shareholders 
of the soundness of their investment given the high-risk nature of banking business.
Recently, Nyamongo and Temesgen (2013) used panel data to examine the impact of CG 
on Kenyan banks performance. The researchers reported that banks are sensitive to large 
board size, and CEO-chair duality has neutral effect on performance; while presence of 
outside directors impacts favourably on performance. Nonetheless, these writers’ failed to 
expound perhaps by incorporating primary data, why CEO-chair duality, a contentious 
variable in CG research (see Dalton and Dalton, 2011) would have a neutral impact on 
performance. Nyamongo and Temesgen’s (2013) findings evidence a shortcoming for 
recommending Kenyan banks to only ‘check’ board size and increase ratio of independent 
directors. Similarly, they discuss CEO-chair duality whilst no evidence shows any bank 
that had a director holding the two roles simultaneously for the period under study.
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2.6 Conclusion
After review of literature, this study has identified agency perspective as most appropriate 
in guiding the data interpretation process. CG problems were also found to be rifer within 
developing countries like Kenya. It has also been identified that banking business is 
heavily regulated, although the influence of regulation on CG effectiveness appears to be a 
contested area. In addition, the literature casts doubt on effectiveness of CG within 
developing countries, due to dissimilarities of institutional arrangements with those from 
which CG originates. This study thereby seeks to identify contextual factors impeding CG 
implementation, and adaptation measures employed to circumvent such obstacles within 
the banking industry. The research also aims to understand how foreign banks contribute to 
CG development within the banking industry. Lastly, the literature review points that CG 
within African countries is under-researched, with little understanding about it. To 
effectively address the areas identified in the discussion above, the research questions 
listed in chapter one will guide the study in locating appropriate evidence to deliver 
meaningful contribution of the topic under research. The first two research sub-questions 
have been designed to start with an outlook of CG within Kenyan banking industry, along 
with the way CG is operationalized. The last research sub-question seeks to examine the 
influence of CG on banking industry’s financial performance.
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Chapter 3
Methods of Data Collection
3.0 Introduction
This chapter describes rationale guiding the research design, choice of methods and data 
collection techniques, along with steps used in data analysis. The first section explains the 
appropriateness of the research design. The second section discusses the philosophical 
stance of the research. The third and fourth sections describe the data collection methods, 
and ethical considerations respectively. The last section describes the methodological 
limitations of this research.
3.1 Research Design
The research design adopted in this study was informed by the research questions 
generated from literature reviewed; and elaborates the strategy used to gather appropriate 
data to answer those questions. The questions are designed to guide the researcher in 
identifying perceptions constructed by senior bank executives, as unit of analysis; who are 
key CG practitioners within their institutions, to explore how they make sense of CG 
guidelines when they implement them. Subsequently, participants’ experiences and 
practices are compared against the banking industry’s performance, with a view to 
understanding how CG may be influencing performance of the banking industry in Kenya.
By adopting a qualitative approach, the study responds to increasing calls for more
qualitative research within CG scholarship, citing the need for ensuing research to
incorporate extensive fieldwork in order to better understand and document CG practices
(Ahrens et al., 2011). Similarly, the qualitative research design has been incentivised by
the need for a fresh methodological approach, given the large number of mixed empirical
results emanating from preceding, predominantly quantitative CG works (Yoshikawa and
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Rasheed, 2009). As Bansal (2013, p. 129) argues, qualitative research is best suited to 
investigate issues in an area “where there exists strbng theory, but inconsistent empirical 
findings”. Using the popular agency perspective, this study aims to employ a qualitative 
methodology to make a contribution that circumvents the pitfall of inconsistent findings by 
previous researchers.
For this purpose, the research incorporates in-depth, semi-structured interviews, with view 
to elicit rich narrations and deeper understanding of the topic under investigation. A 
sample consisting of six senior bank executives and two key CG stakeholders was 
carefully selected to allow for closer engagement with participants, in exploring “real-life” 
CG issues (Zattoni, et al., 2013), as opposed to generalizability usually involved with 
larger samples. Particulars of research interviewees who participated in this research are 
outlined in appendix 6, where pseudonyms have been used to protect their identities and 
that of their institutions. Strict confidentiality is thus ensured as stipulated in the 
University’s guidelines on research ethics. The interview data collected is also triangulated 
for evidence through, verification with other official and archival documentation, as a way 
of ensuring that the research upholds necessary rigor and reaches useful findings.
3.2 Research Approach and Rationale
The community of social science researchers is influenced by two major philosophical
paradigms. One paradigm, positivism, considers the world to be external and views reality
as being objective. Constructionism, the other stance, contends that reality is neither
external nor objective, but socially constructed and given meaning by humans (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2008, p.56). Although positivism has an advantage in generalizability of
findings, this research forwent that to take advantage of the accuracy and contextual
benefits associated with constructionism arguing that, “no empirical method can embrace
all three criteria at the same time”, (Kuhn, cited in Zattoni et al., 2013, p. 119). Consistent
with this argument and to enable reliable interpretation, this study’s sample incorporates a
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small number of participants, adequate to provide sufficiently rich data and permit deeper 
investigation of phenomena. A small sample size is justifiable in phenomenological studies 
seeking to investigate an in-depth problem, through interviewing in order to capture 
respondents’ experiences (Crouch and McKenzie, 2006).
3.3 Data Collection Methods
Primary data forms the main data component, in the form of semi-structured interviews 
conducted with senior bank executives, representative from the capital market regulator 
and a corporate governance trainer. The open-ended nature of the interview questions 
enabled the researcher to control over the participants’ feedback, and help to identify any 
new constructs regarding the way CG is perceived and implemented within Kenyan banks 
(Bansal, 2013), and also for laddering purposes. In addition, field notes were also taken to 
capture researcher’s reflections about interactions with participants’ and their behaviour 
during the interview. Subsequently, the researcher collected secondary data in the form of 
bank annual reports, and Central Bank publications. This secondary data helps to cross­
check the accuracy of the respondents’ accounts, and enhance validity and reliability of the 
findings (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008).
3.4 Data Analysis
This study incorporates both thematic and content analytical techniques, with thematic 
analysis taking precedence as the research predominantly employs textual data derived 
from semi-structured interviews. This follows Grbich’s (2012, p.20) recommendation for 
thematic analysis as a preliminary analytical procedure for qualitative interview data. Here, 
the interview data was transcribed into textual format before reducing it to patterns, which 
helped to understand respondents’ opinions regarding their perception of the phenomena of 
CG and bank performance.
2 Laddering - technique used by researchers to ‘get more’ from a question, by helping the respondent move 
from descriptive accounts to revealing the individual’s value base (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008, p. 146).
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Subsequently, a content analysis was conducted through systematic review of documentary 
evidence including annual reports, bank websites and other archival documents. Curry et 
al. (2009) suggests that documents and other written materials are valuable sources of 
secondary data, an understanding of which helps in listening to respondents’ accounts, and 
enhancing the understanding of transcribed data. This research therefore analysed 
secondary data for the three years, 2010-12, approximately a decade since the adoption of 
CG in Kenya (see appendix 2). This time period avails good opportunity to appraise the 
workings of CG within Kenyan banks, and make relevant and timely recommendations to 
policy.
3.5 Ethical Considerations
In line with ethical requirements guiding thesis research at the Open University, high 
ethical standards were observed at every stage of the research process in order to preserve 
the integrity of the research, and professionalism on the part of researcher. The researcher 
complied with all ethical guidelines by The Open University’s Human Research Ethics 
Committee (HREC). Elaborate planning and constant consultation with supervisors 
culminated in the timely application of an ethics approval from HREC, which was granted 
a favourable opinion before the fieldtrip to Kenya (Appendix 3).
Moreover, the researcher has continued to safeguard the rights of the research participants 
through anonymization of their identities throughout this research. Also, confidentiality of 
data collected continues to be protected to maintain the trust bestowed on the researcher. 
The researcher has also maintained high degree of objectivity in order to minimise 
likelihood of researcher bias. A complete and more explicit description of ethical 
considerations taken into account in this research is provided in Appendix 4.
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3.6 Methodological Limitations
This research has used a small sample size, due to time constraints within which the 
research fieldwork was planned and conducted. Careful sampling of data nonetheless 
enabled for representation of the banking industry in Kenya. Secondly, the purposive 
sampling procedure used in this research diminishes the generalizability of findings across 
other African countries. Future researchers seeking to conduct qualitative research and 
generalise their findings may benefit from use of mixed methods through incorporating 
quantitative data to permit larger and random sample sizes (Punch, 2005, p. 187).
This being a qualitative research, the interpretation of findings reached may possibly be 
subject to other interpretations (Kunes, 1991, cited in Creswell, 2003, p. 149). For instance, 
besides the implementation of CG, other factors such as favourable government policies 
and stable macroeconomic environment during the period under investigation may also 




Collecting and Analysing the Data
4.0 Introduction
This chapter begins by describing the methods employed in collecting data, and afterwards 
discusses the data analysis techniques. At the end of this chapter, the researcher aims to 
account for the process followed in collecting data from participants, and also explain and 
justify the technique adopted in analysis of that data. This chapter thus seeks to develop the 
data collected into suitable form for interpretation so as to build an effective argument 
about the research.
4.1 Collecting the Data
The main consideration that motivated the adoption of qualitative approach in this research 
was its unique advantage in capturing human experiences in both spoken and written 
representations. Additionally being a qualitative research, this study benefited from the 
ability to use multiple sources of data comfortably (Punch, 2005, p. 168). To this effect, this 
study predominantly used in-depth semi-structured interviews as the main data collection 
tools. Subsequently, documentary evidence in the form of secondary data was gathered 
from respective banks annual reports, central bank publications and media articles.
4.1.1 Sampling Procedure
This study adopted a deliberate sampling technique, where the researcher made decision
regarding the participants to include in the sample, based on their wealth of experience
about the topic of research, and willingness to contribute to the study. These individuals
are active participants in the banking industry and the Kenyan corporate governance
landscape, and were therefore deemed to be well placed to provide sufficiently rich
information. Nonetheless, out of the initially identified interviewees, three interviews did
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not materialize after the potential respondents declined to participate. This prompted me to 
approach the Kenya Bankers Association, an umbrella body of banks in Kenya, to enlist 
their support in my research. After a personal introduction to the Association’s director for 
research, I explained the purpose of my research, and discussed the University’s ethical 
guidelines governing the research.
During the discussion, the director agreed to send an email communication to member 
banks notifying them about my research fieldwork, with an appeal to accord me necessary 
support when I call on them. Nevertheless, the decision to participate in the research 
remained at their discretion. Given the limited timeframe within which to conduct the 
fieldwork, I was able to arrange for interviews with six bank officials from large private 
and public banks in Kenya. To a get a broad view about the mechanics of CG in Kenya, 
opinions from other CG stakeholders -  the Centre for Corporate Governance (CCG) and 
the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) were sought. CCG drafted the first CG guidelines 
that were later adopted by the government, while CMA is an autonomous institution which 
regulates the capital markets in Kenya, and enforces the CG code. Although the initial plan 
was to interview a respondent from the Central Bank of Kenya, the decision to include 
respondents from CCG and CMA was taken as an adaptation measure in response to 
refusal for interview, after contacting two different officials from the Central Bank who 
declined to be interviewed at the last minute without explanation (see appendix 5). This 
might be interpreted as an indication of how sensitive bank governance issues may be 
perceived within some institutions.
4.1.2 Primary Data -  Semi-Structured Interviews
To answer the research questions sufficiently, the researcher conducted in-depth interviews
with the intention of identifying how key actors within the Kenyan banking industry,
perceive and practice CG. Face-to-face interviews were preferred over other data collection
tools such as questionnaires because of the flexibility they offer in probing more deeply to
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identify new leads, and explore new facets of phenomena; and intend to gain good 
understanding of participants’ accounts of their lived experiences (Burgess, cited in Easter- 
by Smith, 2008, p. 144).
Accordingly, eight interviews each lasting approximately 50 minutes were conducted with 
senior officials from six banking institutions, as well as CCG and CMA being leading 
players in supporting the development of CG in Kenya. Discussions with the research 
participants sought to understand how CG is perceived and practiced, together with how 
the process of CG influences bank financial performance. The researcher believes that a 
sample size of eight participants is sufficient to achieve the objectives of the research. This 
surpasses Guest et al.’s (2006) recommendation of six interviews on average, for 
phenomenological studies such as this investigation.
The semi-structured interviews were guided by an interview schedule (see appendix 8) that 
was sent to the participants ahead of the interview date, in order to allow them time to 
gather any information necessary to provide sufficient responses. In order to maximise 
from the conversations, the researcher adopted a personalised approach to interviewing, 
where each sampled banks’ annual report were analysed before the interviews were 
conducted.
The interview questions were designed to elicit information around three broad areas:
• Respondents perceptions of corporate governance
• Implementation of corporate governance
• Corporate governance impact on performance
To improve the interview outcome as suggested by Easterby-Smith (2008, p. 147), the 
researcher consistently observed the following practical issues: (i) a focus upon building 
trust with interviewees by assuring them that the interview data shall not be misused, and 
shall be used solely for academic purposes; (ii) use of simple language devoid of any
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theoretical or technical concepts during the interviews; (iii) interviewees were given liberty 
to choose their preferred interview location, and all but two chose to sit in their offices, 
with the two preferring a hotel as neutral setting; (iv) interviews were tape-recorded to 
enhance the listening process and maintain clarity of the conversations. However, three 
interviewees declined to be tape recorded and this prompted me to balance between the 
interview discussion, and noting down brief answers of the questions asked.
All interviews began with an introduction of the researcher together with reasons for 
conducting the interview, and then the interviewee was given a copy of the research 
consent form  where informed consent and permission to tape-record the interview was 
sought after careful review. Appendix 4 provides a copy of the research information and 
consent form used for this research.
4.1.3 Secondary Data -  Documentary Data
Together with the semi-structured interviews, this research further used documentary 
evidence such as bank annual reports, Central Bank publications, and newspaper articles 
along with information from banks websites. Critics of secondary data (Wall et al., cited in 
Easterby-Smith, 2008, p.225) argue that it lags behind time, i.e. between publication dates 
and time research is conducted; plus the likelihood that corporate priorities may have 
changed during research. Nevertheless, this research capitalizes on the benefit of secondary 




4.2.1 Analysis of Interview Data
Transcription of interview discussions was the preliminary step in data analysis, where 
interview conversations were converted into textual data for ease of interpretation. As the 
study sample was relatively small, the researcher chose to manually transcribe the 
interviews in order to sufficiently acquaint himself with the data. Concordant with 
conventions of qualitative research (Rossman and Rallis cited in Creswell 2003, pp. 181), 
this study adopted a more inductive approach in analysing interview data, remaining not 
only faithful to interviewees’ opinions but also capturing the dynamics of context and time 
(Easterby-Smith, 2008, p. 173).
Cognizant that there are several ways of analysing qualitative data (see Easterby-Smith, 
2008, p. 172); the researcher adopted thematic analysis in interrogating the interview data 
thereby articulating interviewees’ expressions, in a more holistic manner that lacks in 
many quantitative studies. Thematic analysis is also argued to be an ‘independent and 
reliable’ approach to qualitative data analysis (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). Nonetheless, 
thematic analysis is criticized for its flexibility, which may result to multiple 
interpretations and impair consistency. To overcome this shortcoming, the researcher 
constantly referred back to the theory to enhance the outcome of the analysis process 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006).
The researcher adopted the generic analytical framework outlined below, in conducting 
qualitative thematic analysis, as recommended by Creswell (2003, p. 191). Cicon et al. 
(2012) used thematic analysis and recognized its advantage in identifying broader CG 
themes besides the provisions included within national CG codes.
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Table 1: Thematic Analysis
Step Description
Step 1: Organizing and 
preparing data
Interview data collected and transcribed into text, in 
preparation for analysis.
Step 2: Getting acquainted with 
the data
Researcher reads through transcribed data trying to identify 
and link emerging concepts.
Step 3: Data reduction Categories identified were grouped by common meanings, 
and thereafter assigned codes.
Step 4: Describing themes Categories under each code were assigned a theme, and 
connected into a storyline to give detailed description 
backed by evidence from respondents’ verbatim.
Step 5: Reporting Meaningful patterns identified from the preceding stage, 
and relating to particular concepts of phenomena were then 
reported in narrative form.
Step 6: Data interpretation Finally, the interview data collected was interpreted to 
answer the research questions following the theoretical lens 
adopted, and backed by prior research findings.
Given the massive amount of data collected during the research fieldwork, the coding 
process in data analysis helped the researcher to extract the important segments of 
participant feedback which were relevant to the study’s research questions, based on the 
meaning they carried. For example, the following is an extract from one of the interviews 
conducted during the research fieldwork:
Researcher: What are your general views regarding the state of corporate governance in 
the Kenyan banking industry?
Respondent (CGP2): Generally good but there is still room for improvement. Banks are 
closely supervised [“regulation”] by CBK and for those that are listed, good governance 
practices are inevitable. Unfortunately, most banks just comply with the minimum 
regulations required by the CBK and very few companies take their own initiative towards 
adopting CG. But, I must say that CG has really helped us because we have not seen any 
major crisis in this industry in the recent past....the non-performing loans [“non­
performing loans”] are now within manageable levels because of the rules such as the one
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limiting directors’ borrowing which was the single biggest cause of bank failures in 
the past due to excessive insider lending (codes assigned: PCG-R; FP-NPL).
From the excerpt above, two labels/codes were attached, PCG-R and FP-NPL. For the first 
code, ‘PCG’ stands for ‘perception of CG’ while 'R’ stands for ‘regulation’. For the next 
code, the first and second sets of letters are abbreviations of ‘financial performance’ and 
‘non-performing loans’ respectively’. The names used in coding the data were picked from 
CG literature so that they could reflect the disciplinary perspective (Creswell, 2003, p. 193).
To further explain on the coding process, we can see respondent CGP2 observing that CG 
has achieved some relative level of success within the banking industry because of intense 
supervision by the regulator. The word regulation is the code that has been inserted to 
capture the meaning of that feedback to help in answering the research question. Still in the 
excerpt above, the respondent narrated that CG has helped the banking industry to control 
losses resulting from non-performing loans. The researcher has therefore used the code 
non-performing loans to represent one of the ways in which CG impacts bank financial 
performance. This process was performed iteratively for all the interview transcripts, 
where common codes were merged to form categories, which best answered the research 
questions set out in this research. The categories were further condensed into themes which 
helped to make sense of the research data. Appendix 9 illustrates a framework of the 
various codes and categories that emerged from data, together with their culminating 
themes which assisted in answering the research questions.
4.2.2 Analysis of Documentary Data
Secondary data, mainly annual reports and CG content from the banks websites was
regularly reviewed both before, and after data collection. Review of secondary data ahead
of the interviews helped to enhance the quality of the interview questions, by selecting the
right questions to ask, together with an awareness of the answers to expect. This follows
Curry et al.’s (2009) suggestion that documents and other written materials are valuable
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sources of secondary data, which help in listening to interviewees’ accounts and enhance 
understanding of transcribed data. The qualitative content analysis permitted the inspection 
of various sources of documentary data i.e. annual reports and websites, to identify how 
CG matters are communicated within banks, together with any influence this had on 
performance. This provided a basis for identifying discrepancies between what banks 
reported to be doing, against respondents’ accounts of what they were actually doing.
Thus, inclusion of documentary analysis also contributed to enhanced reliability and 
internal validity of the findings, where secondary data was used to “make sense of the 
interviewees’ reality and meanings” (Creswell, 2003, p.204), thus developing an accurate 
understanding of CG phenomena. This study will thus give a better insight about the way 
CG is understood by CG players within Kenyan banking industry.
4.3 Ethics in Collecting and Analysing Data
The researcher was consistently aware of all ethical obligations associated with the nature
of this research. This follows from training gained from MRes tutorials, and other research
training workshops where emphasis was placed on need to maintain good ethical practices.
To avoid the ethical pitfalls associated with qualitative research, informed consent was
particularly emphasized and respondents were voluntarily requested to participate in the
research after full awareness about the research was made. In order to maintain mutual
trust with the participants, the researcher has kept the responses from interviewees
confidential, firstly by keeping the information in a secured server, and anonymising the
interviewees’ identities. Finally, the researcher endeavours to uphold an ethically
responsible conduct (Silverman, 2011, p.87) in researching, by limiting the motive of this
research to academic contribution and policy improvement than self-interests. Although no
immediate benefits will be accrued by the participants, the researcher believes the effort
has contributed to a better understanding of CG practices in the Kenyan banking industry,





This chapter provides an interpretation of research data in response to the research 
questions outlined in chapter one. The researcher aims to elucidate how key CG actors 
within the banking industry perceive and practise CG. The chapter closes by looking at 
what this means for bank financial performance. Quotes from interviewee accounts and the 
findings of pertinent CG studies have been included in the interpretation to support the 
argument of the researcher.
5.1 Broader Perspectives of Governance
Research question 1: How do bank executives perceive the process o f  corporate 
governance implementation?
Firstly, to fulfil the objectives of the research, this section reflects on the relevance of data 
to the first research question. The first two sections below provide interviewees’ 
understanding of CG from theoretical and ‘local’ perspectives respectively. The third 
section delivers the relationship between regulation and governance. The fourth section 
looks at the sense that interviewees attach to CG and performance link. The final section 
shows how board governance is regarded in the banking institutions.
5.1.1 Meaning of CG
The research fieldwork began by seeking to find out what CG meant for the interviewees. 
In this regard, the most striking revelation was the observation that, behind the well-crafted 
CG statements about the way banks’ define and practice CG, interviewees’ accounts
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presented contested understandings of CG. For instance, recalling the costly bank collapses 
of 1980s and 1990s in Kenya, a respondent remarked as follows:
In my opinion, good CG entails accountability and transparency; two main 
ingredients for the successful running o f  any business (CGP1, CMA).
Other notable meanings attached to the concept of CG by various respondents include:
CG are control mechanisms meant to help shareholders keep vigil o f their 
funds ...ensuring they’re utilised in their best o f interests ...CG helps to attract and 
sustain investor confidence through assurance that their money is in right 
hands...(CGP2, domestic listed bank).
...CG entails structures necessary for proper running o f a business ...touching on 
all people not just the top management ...it brings uniformity and order in the way 
business is conducted (CGP3, foreign private bank).
Interestingly, the interviewees’ understanding of CG as narrated in their accounts tends to 
reflect the ownership structures of their institutions. For instance, the last two excerpts 
above suggest how a quoted bank’s approach to CG may differ from a privately-owned 
bank. Respondent CGP2 for instance, who is from listed bank, defined governance as 
revolving around shareholders and top management; while respondent CGP3 saw CG as 
mainly guidelines for the general running of a firm.
CG is a measure that provides lifeline to poorly performing businesses so that they 
can be able to get back on their feet (CGP4, domestic private bank).
Whereas the overarching opinion depicted CG as a tool for corporate control, interviewee 
CGP4, identified CG to be a panacea mainly for struggling businesses, rather than an 
indispensable norm in the day-to-day running of a bank. This shows that some bank 
executives understand CG mainly from a strategic perspective, perhaps oblivious of the 
significant operational implications associated with CG. The account of interviewee CGP4 
above might also be interpreted to suggest that CG is still a little known concept in the
Kenyan corporate sector, as discussed in the next section.
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5.1.2 Corporate Governance: A Foreign Concept?
The other sub-theme that emerged from the broader conceptualization of governance by 
majority of the interviewees opined CG to be a foreign ideology. Interestingly, despite the 
official adoption of CG by the government, more than a decade ago, CG is seemingly still 
viewed as a foreign standard that has little relevance to Kenya’s corporate sector.
CG is still seen as a foreign concept that is less appreciated within many privately- 
owned banks...if you look at some o f the family-owned banks around, telling them 
to bring outside directors ’ makes them anxious o f losing control o f a business they 
have built from scratch (CGP5, large private bank).
Majority of the respondents noted that CG requirements regarding disclosures and board 
independence are seen as intrusion to otherwise closely-held family/ethnic business 
interests, in a country where many banks are in the hands of private owners. This 
discussion evidences divergence of local institutional characteristics from the basis upon 
which Anglo-American CG model is premised. The agency implication in this instance 
thus shifts from principal-agent scenario to principal-principal conflict apparent within 
developing countries (Renders and Gaeremynck, 2012); where majority shareowners 
through familial shareholding might exploit minority shareholders.
Another interviewee added that:
Historically, we did not have CG...this thing is still in the nascent stages with many 
people gradually implementing it (CGP2, domestic listed bank).
This shows that CG is yet to fully integrate with the business culture and corporate 
structures in the banking industry, which may indicate a need to do a CG review to identify 
areas of misalignment, and make necessary customization for quick adaptability within the 
industry.
Although CG has been around for almost a decade now, it is still a relatively new 
concept to many companies in Kenya (CGP1, CMA).
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Corresponding to the view above, respondents from domestic banks saw CG as mainly a 
preserve for multinational banks and other listed companies, which has little to do with 
their banks. The slow uptake of CG within the banking sector is therefore not surprising, 
given the fact that private banks dominate the banking sector, with listed banks constituting 
a very small proportion of the industry.
Nonetheless, there was a common view that albeit the exotic perception of CG, the banking 
industry has made significant steps in implementing key CG mechanisms compared to 
other sectors of the economy. This was attributed to intense regulation and enforcement by 
the regulator, a factor opined by the interviewees to be the main expediter of CG. This is 
elucidated in the next section.
5.1.3 Regulation and Governance
Debate has persisted on how much intervention a government should apply in the banking 
industry, which protagonists contend that effective bank CG requires regulator 
involvement (Mullineux, 2006), with critics charging that regulator motives diverge from 
the wishes of the bank owners (Caprio et al., 2007). For the respondents, the role of 
regulation in safeguarding CG was perceived as follows:
It is better if  government intervenes in enforcing CG adoption...regulation is a sure 
way o f ensuring a level playing field  (CGP5, large private bank).
Another interviewee had this to say:
...why set up additional departments or hire extra outside directors to be just 
sitting and taking allowances? These are avoidable costs that people would do 
anything to prevent ...if you remove the regulatory push, this bandwagon will slow 
down because it has cost implications (CGP3, foreign private bank).
The interviewees commonly noted that the active regulation of the banking sector, and 
which lacked in other non-bank industries, has led to increased adoption of CG within 
banking institutions.
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While linking the high CG compliance levels within the banking industry to regulatory 
enforcement, another interviewee summed up that, banks are obligated to conform to 
certain standards to avoid the hefty fines and penalties that non-compliance attracts:
...for the banking industry, the regulator is strict, they have set rules o f  the game on 
what should be done by every bank as a minimum. I f  you ’re required to do 
something and you fail, there is a penalty, and it is not small money, usually to the 
extent o f  half-a-million shillings, and sometimes a million shillings... (CGP4, 
domestic private bank).
The statement above suggests that enforcement is the greatest driver of CG uptake within 
the banking industry, without which majority of the banks might not comply with CG. This 
explains the second research question that, many banks practise CG in order to avoid hefty 
fines or their boards being reprimanded by regulators.
Generally, based on the evidence from respondent feedback above, CG still appears not to 
have evolved to the levels where it can be left to market forces as a driver for compliance 
within the Kenyan banking industry. The mainstream opinion as narrated by interviewees 
is that, CG lacks an impetus of its own, and thus requires regulatory support. This agrees 
with Hagendorff et al. (2010), argument that regulation is complementary to CG, where it 
enhances shareholder wealth through effecting key CG mechanisms such as board 
independence, and monitoring roles. Not least, the interviewees’ accounts testify that 
where CG is intertwined with banking regulations, the bank executives are obliged to 
implement those guidelines.
5.1.4 Corporate Governance and Performance Nexus
The influence of CG on firm performance has been riddled with conflicting views where 
advocates of CG (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008) cite favourable association between the two, 
while gainsayers (Brown and Caylor, 2006) argue that certain CG mechanisms have 
negative effect on performance. The respondents too shared diverse opinions regarding
their perceived value of CG on performance, implying that CG is still a contested subject. 
Though no respondent suggested negative association between CG and performance, 
deeper discussions showed their perceived impact of CG on performance ranging from a 
strong and direct to a near neutral links.
...CG brings proper structures that are necessary for proper running o f the bank, 
with accruing benefits following later... i f  we have two banks where one adheres to 
good CG and another lacks proper CG structures, the former will have consistent 
performance while the latter will show a very erratic performance... (CGP5, large 
private bank).
This statement reflects the view amongst a section of interviewees that CG helps to not 
only improve performance but also achieve sustainable growth. The actual impact of CG 
on performance was cited as more visible in the long-run rather than instantaneous. For 
instance, interviewee CGP5, cited that good CG helps their bank to manage performance 
through ‘bad times’, while banks without proper CG structures stand to report decent 
performance only during boom times. Further reflection on the link between CG and 
performance shows CG as insurance that guarantees shareholders consistency of returns 
from their investments.
Similarly, another interviewee noted:
...there is a very strong link between CG and performance ...CG is a check on a 
number o f  factors that can hamper performance if  not restrained like conflict o f  
interest, insider lending, and misappropriation o f a bank’s assets... all these factors 
if  not checked could greatly hurt and even bring a big bank to its knees... (CGP 6, 
CCG).
These interviewees appreciated that CG has a big role to play in improving performance 
and long-term survival of banking institutions.
Nonetheless, contrary views emerged where some interviewees narrated that no direct
linkage exists between CG and performance. The lack of direct link may arguably indicate
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that the influence of CG on performance is more visible in the longer-term rather than 
short-term. This group of respondents seemed to agree on one thing -  although they don’t 
dispute the need for good CG within banks, it has been glorified so much, as a ‘magic 
touch’ to business success, perhaps in an attempt to endear it to many managers:
...CG and performance have a negligible link...CG as a driver o f  performance? I  
would call it a constant that is on the far-end o f the performance equation... the 
contributing effect is minimal...it’s a negligible constant in the current environment 
(CGP3, foreign private bank).
During discussion, interviewee CGP3 claimed that CG has a long way before it can be 
directly attributed to performance within the banking industry. As narrated, a majority of 
the banks continue to report increased profitability, not because of CG but a growing 
number of Kenyans who continue to open bank accounts in a country where a large 
segment of population is still unbanked. This indicates that CG may possibly not be 
considered a priority within some banks since they still report good performance, thus 
lacking motivation to voluntarily embrace CG beyond the threshold required under law.
Surprisingly, a respondent observed that some local banks continue reporting impressive
performance while lacking strong CG structures:
...some banks don’t follow proper CG structures but they still perform well... most
indigenous banks have backers...mainly people from a particular tribe or
community who will always take their money to the bank and would die with it
(CGP2, domestic listed bank).
In light of this remark, there may be suggestive evidence to explain why some domestic
banks would appear cautious towards implementing CG, as compared to their foreign
peers. These banks, as noted have an affiliation with certain tribal groupings which form a
bulk of their customers and perhaps investors; and who will take their money to ‘their’
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banks with CG being the least of their concerns. This proposition opens a possible avenue 
for future research on whether socio-cultural factors inhibit the applicability of CG in 
Kenya.
Another respondent reported that indigenous banks outperform big foreign-banks 
perceived to have strong CG (see Juma, 2013), implying that there might be a dull side to 
CG. Alternative argument as to why foreign banks financial performance is overshadowed 
by domestic banks, despite being viewed as having advanced CG structures, might be 
interpreted to mean that CG may only be a factor among many that influence the 
performance of banks in Kenya.
5.1.5 Board of Directors
Under agency theory, an effective board is assumed to result in a contented principal, who 
must formulate an efficient contract to attract and retain the best agents and win their 
dedicated service (Eisenhardt, 1989). As to the role that boards should play in banks the 
respondents’ views were quite varied.
...our board gives strategic direction...they decide w e ’re going regional, and 
identify the country to venture into, and at what level...buying an existing 
institution or starting from zero...How much money to lay for that 
investment... (CGP4, domestic private bank).
Another view saw the board as a key link to getting business.
We didn’t have outside directors before...but after the requirement for  
independence came into force, we went out looking for people who have a 
name...we can associate with them, and they can swing business to the bank 
because o f  the network they have... (CGP5, large private bank).
The above statements show that various banks tend to have different motivations when 
they set to fill board positions, perhaps consistent with their organizational objectives.
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Some banks go for individuals who will network them with other businesses; while others 
seek professionals to steer them to greater growth and performance.
Also, the average age of most boards, as one interviewee stated, ‘previously dominated by 
retirees’ is falling as banks seek younger, more qualified individuals unlike in the past, 
when one’s status in society was the main basis of appointment.
...there has been a lot o f push to get young people with expertise into 
boards...people are resigning as CEOs to become board members for purposes o f  
ensuring that they can interrogate the management (CGP3, foreign private bank). 
This was summed up by a local leading business newspaper as follows:
...CEOs, chief financial officers, and chief marketing officers...and serving 
managers are increasingly retiring to take up new boardroom roles in 
banking... (Ngigi, 2012).
This change of jobs according to the publication is as a result of rise in directors pay, 
which has seen banks ‘race to tap talent with deep knowledge of the business’ (Ngigi, 
2012), amid heightened competition within the industry from more foreign banks. 
Expectedly, foreign banks entry in developing countries spurs competition and drives 
domestic banks to emulate ‘good’ governance (Arun and Turner, 2004).
For board size, the interviewees commonly agreed that while bigger boards might increase 
agency costs, decision making process wouldn’t be problematic with the right minds, as 
committees do much of the work with the board only having to ratify them.
...there is no universal board size. The nature o f  bank’s business is the main 
determinant o f  board structure ...the size o f  a bank also determines the number o f  
board committees (CGP1, CMA).
The above discussion challenges Nyamongo and Temesgen’s, (2013) conclusion that 
[unspecified] bigger boards adversely affect bank performance in Kenya. The respondent 
noted that banks usually tend to have larger boards than non-bank companies. Banks might
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also have large boards due to Central Bank’s mandatory requirement of four committees 
(Central Bank of Kenya, 2013), two extra committees compared to non-bank firms. 
Regarding directors pay, interviewees cited that while there was a misconception that bank 
directors are overpaid, which may imply higher agency costs; the high pay was justifiable 
on two grounds. First, requirement for bank boards to be independent means most directors 
do not own shares in the banks they serve, and monetary remuneration was the other way 
they are paid. Also mentioned was the frequency of board meetings, necessitated by the 
nature of banking business.
Kenyan banks held on average 20 meetings apart from bank XXXX where directors 
had about 40...companies in other sectors held fewer than 15 board sessions, with 
those sitting in bank boards generating out sizedfees (Omondi, 2011).
This shows that bank boards, unlike companies in other economic sectors, have wider roles 
and responsibilities, and indicatively high expectations bestowed upon them by the bank 
owners and government in steering their institutions to prosperity. This might also be 
interpreted to mean that whilst the frequent board meetings may raise agency costs, the 
bank owners benefit from improved performance, as directors’ keep the management in 
check, ensuring that they perform to increase stockholder wealth (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).
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5.2 Key Considerations in Maintaining CG within Banking Institutions in 
Kenya
Research question 2: How is corporate governance practiced within Kenyan banks?
5.2.1 Board Governance
All interviewees unanimously acknowledged that bank boards are pivotal for CG progress, 
and have the onus of ensuring appropriate CG is maintained. It was thus commonly agreed 
that an effective and properly constituted board was necessary for ‘good’ CG to flourish, as 
only a CG receptive board would enhance governance in their institution.
Remarks of initiatives taken to maintain ‘good’ governance included, board independence 
as narrated:
...in the past we never had independent directors, but today we have two and we ’re 
in the process o f hiring additional independent directors ...(CGP 2, domestic listed 
bank).
...w e’re trying to increase board independence, how w e’re doing this is by having 
more non-execs on the boards, someone who has no stake in the bank and is purely 
independent... (CGP5, large private bank).
The interviewees stated that their institutions were appointing more [qualified] non­
executive directors who could objectively interrogate the management, and by so doing 
fulfil their role of monitoring management behaviours (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Another approach mentioned by respondents in implementing CG was scouting for more 
directors who had vast expertise in risk management.
...the governance o f banks is unique in the sense that we hold money entrusted to 
us by our customers... we take the risk. Because o f  that element o f risk, whoever sits 
on the board o f a bank must be able to understand that... (CGP 4, domestic private 
bank).
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...bank boards including the MDs should be financial experts and risk management 
professionals ...our bank has tried to hire more directors into the board with these 
skills...risk management skills are especially important because the market is 
changing very fast (CGP2, domestic listed bank).
The above accounts indicate that risk is a significant consideration for boards in the 
banking industry in Kenya, and an effective board is expected to possess risk management 
know-how. Deeper conversations with interviewees disclosed that many of the risks the 
banks faced largely touched on customers - depositors and borrowers; showing that bank 
directors in Kenya have to balance between shareholder and customer interests (Macey and 
O’Hara, 2003). This indicates a shortcoming of Agency theory, which exclusively 
advocates for shareholder interests as the sole concern for directors (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Thus, this theory needs to be further refined to reflect the broader fiduciary responsibilities 
of bank directors, unlike their non-banking firm counterparts, owing to the fact that non­
shareholder constituencies supply more capital to banking institutions than the shareowners 
(Reaz and Arun, 2006).
Also cited to help in maintaining CG by the banks is subscribing directors to the Kenya 
Institute of Directors , where they’re constantly trained on governance and strategic 
leadership skills. The respondents also recognized the contribution of director trainings and 
seminars as another avenue through which ‘good’ CG is nurtured within the Kenyan 
banking industry.
...there are also continuous trainings o f  our directors in order to enable them 
discharge their board responsibilities more effectively ...they are also reminded and
3 Institute of Directors (Kenya) - professional organization of individual corporate directors committed to 
principles of good governance and professional practice of corporate directorship in Kenya (see 
http://www.iodkenya.co.ke).
46
made to understand the expectations, and functions o f the board committees they 
serve in... (CGP5, large private bank).
...bank directors go for constant training, otherwise management may be ahead o f  
them and their contribution in the bank may become irrelevant ...our bank takes 
board members for continuous CG and leadership training as far as UK & South 
Africa. We also engage re-known management trainers locally... (CGP 2, domestic 
listed bank).
Although frequent directors’ trainings were considered to have been important in the 
development of CG, some respondents narrated that the content discussed during the 
seminars tended to be far too ‘exotic’.
When we go for seminars, you find the case study is so far-fetched. The examples 
discussed do not f it  within the local business context... director s ’ seminars should 
incorporate local and regional examples... (CGP5, large private bank).
Other notable initiatives cited by the respondents as boosting board governance, and 
helping to maintain CG in banks are highlighted next. Respondents opined that their boards 
met more frequently, a thing they attributed to the impressive aggregate performance of the 
banking industry in Kenya. They noted that this allowed their boards to deliberate on any 
emerging issues, and respond swiftly to new threats or business opportunities. This view is 
synonymous with Ngigi (2012), who noted that banks in Kenya had on average 20 board 
sittings, against a statutory requirement of 4 meetings per year.
...some Kenyans are returning from diaspora with a lot o f experience having 
worked in leading organisations in UK, South Africa and USA...and taking up 
responsibilities in big local banks...where they are helping to sort things 
out...(CGP2, domestic listed bank).
This return of highly-skilled Kenyans, with experiences from the global stage has also been 
attributed as a significant factor in propelling CG within the banking industry.
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5.2.2 Influences from Global Stage
Besides regulatory enforcement, respondents also cited interactions with international 
institutions to be a significant driver of CG within the banking industry. As narrated, this 
pressure emanated from the presence of foreign banks in the Kenyan banking industry, and 
desire to win business deals with foreign firms that demanded certain CG threshold.
...we partner with organisations outside the country, who through our bank invest 
in this country; they cannot come straight and invest, they will loan us money 
which we in turn loan out to our customers. What helps us to win their confidence 
is by having good governance (CGP4, Local private bank).
As respondent CGP4 stated, Kenyan banks have been under pressure to adopt ‘good’ CG 
so that they can appeal to other financial institutions overseas which use CG as a criteria 
before they can do business with a local bank.
Another interviewee, stated:
...w e’re intending to begin sustainability reporting...the good thing about 
sustainability reporting is that it has a lot o f  good CG as it looks at environment, 
human capital and financial sustainability o f the bank... governance is intertwined 
in all that... (CGP2, domestic listed bank).
This respondent further noted that some foreign banks in Kenya already have in place 
triple bottom line reporting (TBL)4, which as opined, is favoured by external investors 
whom the bank targets. The statement further emphasizes the earlier opinion that foreign 
banks continue to play a major role in the development of CG within the Kenyan banking 
industry. This view concurs with Zaman (2007) who observes that TBL involves robust 
corporate planning and a great deal of CG, due to the associated disclosure and
4 Triple bottom line reporting measures organizational performance along three dimensions: economic, 
social and environmental sustainability with a view to safeguard continuous survival of business entity 
(Keay, 2011, p. 218).
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transparency. This interpretation also opens up an avenue for further research on the role 
sustainability reporting plays in boosting ‘good’ governance and associated performance 
within the banking industry in Kenya.
5.2.3 Audit
5.2.3.1 Internal Audit
The respondents agreed that audit plays a big role in safeguarding ‘good’ governance 
within the banking industry. To begin with, internal audit was mentioned as one of the 
ways in which the board of directors as ‘eyes’ of the shareholders, police management 
actions. To this effect, the internal audit function was perceived as a first-line of defence 
towards the implementation of CG.
Internal audit’s objectives are part o f the deliverables that are aimed at promoting 
CG ...internal audit interrogates the various management committees to see: (1) 
what deliverables are they given by the board? (2) Are they delivering? (3) how are 
they delivering? (CGP5, large private bank).
...they are the eyes o f  the board...they check whether a firm ’s systems are proper 
and if  they find a problem, the internal audit should be the first people to raise the 
alarm...(CGPI CMA).
The interviewees cited independence of internal audit department to be a key determinant 
in ensuring the effectiveness with which the function realised its objectives. It also 
emerged that the heads of internal audit (HIA) report directly to the board audit committee, 
and the CEO has no authority to fire the HIA. Moreover, the HIA only report to the CEO 
administratively in a ‘dotted’ line, to ensure that appropriate controls and governance 
systems are maintained.
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Respondents also noted that banks are equipping their internal control staff with advanced 
ICT skills to ensure that they are effective even when they audit sophisticated banking 
systems at a time when the industry is continually embracing new technologies.
In the past you would find that the audit people only audited things which they 
know, mostly paper-based evidence ...That is why fraud would occur in these areas 
but you would find very good internal audit reports, only to uncover a very serious 
fraud that has been running for some time... (CGP4, domestic private bank).
5.2.3.2 External Audit
Another way in which CG is maintained in the Kenyan banking industry is through the 
external audit function. As one interviewee stated:
External auditors confirm that financial statements are true and fair, and they give 
the actual representation o f  the firm financial position... they objectively assess the 
workings o f the firm... (CGP1, CMA).
It was noted that external auditors help to attest all important information is disclosed to 
the shareholders and other pertinent stakeholders, and ensure that managers do not 
misappropriate the banks resources or hide their unpopular decisions.
Nevertheless, some respondents expressed concerns that the quality of external audit was 
increasingly compromised by close business links that existed between the banking 
institutions and some of the audit firms.
...at times the external auditors are compromised due to their involvement with the 
same banks that they audit... the biggest percentage o f their revenues derives from  
consultancy work which they do for many o f  the banks, far more than the audit fees 
they charge them... as a result, if  yo u ’re an auditor, you would not be able to
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question so much. In fact, at times they have been accused o f assisting the banks to 
manage/cover up questionable transactions... (CGP7, Foreign listed bank).
This account thus raises doubt on the effectiveness of external auditors as gatekeepers of 
CG within banking institutions in Kenya.
Another interviewee commented:
The value added by external auditors is limited...we have 44 banks which have to 
publish their audited accounts within 3 months after end o f financial year, meaning 
the four main audit firms have very little time to give attention to fine details that 
may help to unearth serious issues in banks... (CGP2, domestic listed bank).
A few interviewees however mentioned that their banks had interim audits carried out on 
them, within the first half of the year to give the auditors an opportunity to identify 
anything they would like to spend more time on at the end of the year during the final 
audit.
5.2.3.3 CG Compliance Audit
Another way in which CG is maintained within the banking industry is by having a unit to 
closely monitor the implementation of laid down standards. This was commonly cited by 
the respondents to be another way of ascertaining that the banks are complying CG:
We have an independent department that ensure all the CG regulations that have 
been issued have actually been complied with (CGP7, Foreign listed bank).
This respondent stated that their compliance function ensures that all regulatory and group 
CG guidelines are fully complied with, and in the end assisting the bank to maintain all 
specified CG requirements.
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Nonetheless, the Central Bank of Kenya has recently passed a requirement where all banks 
must set up compliance divisions whose heads report directly to the board, to safeguard 
independence.
...the institution should establish an independent compliance function that provides 
assistance to the board and management in complying with applicable laws, rules,
, codes and standards. (Guideline on Corporate Governance, CBK, 2013).
Whilst the Central Bank of Kenya has now made it mandatory for banks to have 
compliance functions, respondent CGP7 above noted that their institution already had the 
department in place. Further discussions revealed that the bank being a multinational, CG 
trickles down from the parent company, and this might be interpreted to mean that foreign 
banks continue to play a positive role in promoting ‘good’ governance within developing 
economies.
5.2.4 Shareholders
It clearly emerged that the role of maintaining appropriate governance is not an onus of the 
bank executives and industry regulators alone. Instead, shareholders as principals also have 
a role to play in promoting ‘good’ CG within the banking industry in Kenya. For instance, 
the Central Bank of Kenya’s CG principles stipulates:
Shareholders o f banking institutions shall jointly and severally protect, preserve 
and actively exercise supreme authority o f  the institution in general meetings. They 
have a duty, jointly and severally, to exercise that supreme authority. (Guideline on 
Corporate Governance, CBK, 2013).
The statement above coincides with the view held by some respondents from listed banks 
that:
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We now have more empowered shareholders asking very strong questions during 
the AGMs...wonderful questions o f  cashflow, and some o f  the key performance 
indicators ...asking hard questions from directors about the expenditure o f the 
company ...those are the shareholders we need (CGP6, CCG).
Compared to 3 or 4 years ago, the shareholders in Kenya are a bit 
enlightened...the quality o f questions at AGMs seems to be better...people are 
actually taking some time to read through the annual reports... (CGP1, CMA).
This statement indeed shows that shareholders are part and parcel to the CG process, and 
have a duty to play in ensuring that they elect the right people into the board, and appraise 
their performance closely.
Interestingly, deeper discussions revealed the extent to which majority of the listed banks 
go to make sure that their shareholders can comfortably participate in the running of their 
banks.
As you can see from our annual reports, we try to report in both English as well as 
Swahili so that even those investors who cannot read English are not left out... we 
were the first bank to do this, and nowadays nearly all banks are doing the same. 
As you can see from our annual accounts, apart from our parent company’s 
shareholding, local individual investors form the bulk o f  our 
shareholding... (CGP7, foreign listed bank).
The above statement is an indication of the commitment by some banking institutions in 
ensuring that shareholders, as owners, are actively involved in implementing CG. It can 
also be interpreted as an adaptation technique used by the banking institutions in ensuring 
equitable shareholder treatment, and increase the comprehension of the banks’ annual 
reports to both present and potential investors.
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Although no Kenyan banking or other corporate laws require annual reports to be in 
Swahili language, as Tauringana et al. (2008) rightly points out, Swahili represents the 
African heritage, along with the fact that majority of investors have low levels of 
educational qualifications. These writers further attributes the rationale for dual language 
reporting as a way of increasing comprehension of the annual reports to present and 
potential investors. On reflection, this section implies that shareholders have a duty to 
actively participate in the CG process of their banking institutions.
5.3 Effect of CG on Financial Performance of Banking Institutions in Kenya
Research question 3: How does compliance with corporate governance guidelines impact 
on performance o f  banking industry in Kenya?
Further to the respondents’ implied opinions that CG plays a crucial role in boosting 
performance of the Kenyan banking industry, (see section 5.1.4 above). Deeper discussions 
sought to understand how CG is manifested in their banks financial performance, through 
their ‘eyes’. This helped to listen to the actual CG practitioners, examine effectiveness of 
CG standards and identify challenges encountered in pursuing improved organizational 
outcomes.
5.3.1 Going Concern Value
The main theme that emerged when respondents were asked to describe how CG is 
manifested in their banks performance, was the benefit of managerial excellence associated 
with CG. As noted, well managed firms are likely to remain going concerns in the 
foreseeable future.
Previously, CG issues were largely low priority areas in Kenya’s banking sector. 
Directors were never vetted, shareholders could start banks almost at will, the role
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o f the external auditors was not well defined... these deficiencies resulted in laxity 
by some boards, and management o f institutions. The effect was imprudent lending 
practices, excessive investment in fixed assets, inadequate systems to measure, 
identify and control risks ...leading to banking collapses o f  the 1980s and 1990s... 
(CBK, Bank Supervision Annual Report, 2001).
I f i t ’s known that a bank has so many frauds every other day and customers are 
losing money left-right-and-centre, no depositor would take their money and more 
importantly no investor would want to put their money in that bank because it 
might be declared insolvent any time... (CGP7, foreign listed bank).
These statements might be interpreted to mean that CG is not only seen as a tool for 
improving performance and consequently shareholder wealth, but firstly as a guarantee to 
potential investors that a particular bank is worthy investment, and reassurance to existing 
owners that their business will continue operating into the future.
5.3.2 Reduced Non-Performing Loans Portfolio
It was commonly recognized that certain CG mechanisms have assisted in maintaining 
non-performing loans portfolio within limits. The respondents further noted that reduced 
non-performing loans translated to better asset quality and more profitability in their banks.
...we have a [board] credit committee looking at the health o f our loans, constantly 
reviewing how good our loan book is, and advising us on what to do when there 
are doubtful loans...(CGP4, domestic private bank).
The presence of a mandatory board committee on credit was viewed to play a great role in 
checking non-performing loans within banks in Kenya. Non-performing loans were cited 
to be the biggest burden that had led to insolvency and subsequent collapse of banks in the 
previous banking crises in Kenya (Brownbridge, 1998, p. 13).
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Figure 1 presents a comparison of non-performing loans portfolio for the last four years 
(2009-2012) with those before, around, and immediately after the CG was formally 
adopted in Kenya (2001 -2004).
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Source: Central Bank of Kenya -  Bank Supervision Annual Reports
Consistent with the interviewees views, it is evident from the figure above that the size of 
non-performing loans portfolio within the Kenyan banking industry has remarkably 
dropped from an average of 25.8% between 2001 and 2004, to a low of 1.95% within the 
last four years.
While emphasizing the importance of CG in managing the size of non-performing loans, 
which in turn impacts on other performance measures, another interviewee stated that:
...when your loan book goes bad, you must immediately make provision in your 
interest and provision for the loans you ’re unable to recover. That provisioning
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means your profits will slump immediately, and your core5 capital will also go 
down...(CGP8, Government owned bank).
CG, as pointed by the respondents continues to play a big role in keeping the non­
performing loans portfolio within manageable levels, and consequently boosting the 
performance of banking institutions.
...the past bank failures were caused mainly by insider lending... the CG laws have 
now capped borrowing by directors to 20% o f core capital, where such borrowing 
must be communicated to the Central Bank... (CGP2, domestic listed bank).
Thus, CG was felt to have an influence on performance because insiders can no longer 
borrow excessively, a problem attributed as the main cause of previous banking failures in 
Kenya (Brownbridge, 1998, p. 13). Additionally, the current CG provision for banks to 
demand security while lending to insiders imply that, shareholders’ capital is relatively 
secure than it was in the past.
Besides CG, another significant explanation for to the dramatic reduction in the size of 
non-performing loans is the establishment of credit reference bureaus in year 2008, 
allowing for the sharing of information about ‘serial defaulters’ whom according to the 
Central Bank of Kenya used to exploit the information asymmetry that existed in the past, 
by defaulting on loans borrowed from different banks (Central Bank of Kenya, n.d).
5.3.3 Cost Efficiency
The respondents also observed that increased compliance with CG regulations had 
contributed to increased efficiency. As noted, a big number of Kenya’s population is still 
unbanked, leading to stiff competition as 44 banks look for ways to survive in a smaller
5 Core capital - fully-paid shares + previous year’s reserves + any tier capital acquired + 50% per cent of 
current year’s earnings.
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market. Bank boards are therefore compelled to come up with strategic objectives to lower 
costs and remain competitive.
...the bank is always on the lookout for the latest ICT technology under the 
guidance o f the board IT sub-committee which helps in identifying strategic ICT 
resources...we believe by investing in them we will reduce our costs such as wage 
bill...(CGP4, domestic private bank).
...our bank recently completed an acquisition o f a massive ICT project which we ’re 
very confident will transform the bank...we have seen a drop in our operating costs 
and I  can tell you we ’re set for long-term growth... (CGP2, domestic listed bank).
Respondents were unanimous that salaries and wages formed the biggest component of 
their costs, and that bank boards have a critical role to play in looking for strategic ways to 
lower costs. It also emerged that adoption of IT infrastructure was the most common 
method preferred for cost cutting as banks seek to position themselves for long-term 
growth.
Besides automation, agency banking6 was cited to be another cost-cutting measure used in 
the banking industry.
Due to hard economic times the bank repositioned itself for future growth... during 
the year we successfully recruited and obtained approval from Central Bank for  
over 2400 agents ...this will lower our operating costs and grow our transaction 
based income (Annual Report, 2011, domestic listed bank).
Agency banking was noted to have contributed to tremendous growth in income and 
reduction in the high costs associated with establishing new branches. The discussion
6 Agency banking -  refers to a model of banking where banks engage third parties (agents) to offer certain 
banking services in their behalf (Central Bank of Kenya, 
http://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/banksupervision#agent-banking)
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above might be inferred that boards in Kenyan banks continue to contribute immensely by 
identifying strategic avenues to reduce costs, and through strategic contribution deliver 
their mandate of increasing shareholder returns (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).
Figure 2 below shows a comparison in efficiency levels between two periods; before CG 
was enforced (2001-2004) and the period of investigation (2009-2012).
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Source: Central Bank of Kenya -  Bank Supervision Annual Reports
Consistent with the interviewees’ views, it is evident from the figure above that aggregate 
cost efficiency banking industry has improved from an average of 82% between 2001 and 
2004, to 59% within the last four years. In line with agency perspective, the strategic role 
of boards in the Kenyan banks emerges as an important aspect in guiding their 
organisations to prosperity. This concurs with Andres and Vallelado (2008), that banking 
business requires directors who advise management appropriately and assist identifying 
and executing the right strategies. This section partly answers the third research question, 
where cost efficiency, which emanates from deliberate planning, is identified as major 
contributor to enhanced banking industry performance. This explains how CG impacts on 
bank performance in Kenya.
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5.3.4 Earnings
The respondents further mentioned that their institutions had benefited from ‘good’ CG, as 
reflected in the increased earnings of the banks. Some of the successes attributed to CG 
include diversification of products to diversify revenue, and establishment of branches in 
regional countries which arise from bank directors’ contribution to strategy. Some 
interviewees also cited that their boards had restructured their management structures to fit 
better within their banks objectives.
To increase our profit base, new products were introduced, and bank management 
structure realigned with the overall strategy...the bank has moved from purely 
wholesale banking to include retail banking (CGP5, large private bank).
This respondent stated that their bank’s income has continued to rise with diversification of 
products and target clientele. For instance, respondents stated that their banks had moved 
beyond giving loans to mortgage and asset financing to expand their earnings. 
Additionally, the decision by the board to restructure executive structures might be 
interpreted to show that, the board exercised a critical duty of control over the agents in 
delivering shareholder value. Related to this interpretation, Zahra and Pearce (1989) argue 
that control is the most important task of a board in achieving organisational performance.
Some respondents also mentioned the decision to expand into neighbouring countries as 
another way they have managed to grow their revenues, and the wealth of their 
shareholders.
We are continuously considering opening more branches in the neighbouring 
countries in order to widen our market...we shall soon be expanding our 
operations into XXXcountry... (CGP3, foreign private bank).
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Kenyan banks had subsidiaries with 282 branches operating in the region in 2012 
representing an increase o f  59 branches from 2011 ...(CBK, Bank Supervision 
Annual Report, 2012).
In answering the third research question, the narrations above show how bank directors 
while discharging their CG duties, make strategic choices that favourably impact on 
performance. The interviewees stated that the heightened regional presence of Kenyan 
banks had helped to improve the aggregate income of the banking industry. They cited this 
as an indication of the banks’ leadership commitment to maximising shareholders wealth.
Figure 3: Return on Equity (RoE %)
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Source: Central Bank of Kenya -  Bank Supervision Annual Reports
The figure above shows relatively improved performance for RoE7 from an average of 
18.45 between years 2001-04, to an average of 28.52 during the last four years. As the 
respondents pointed out, it might be inferred that banks in Kenya have continued to grow 
their network and products on offer as they seek to grow their income bases. This therefore 
provides explanation to the third research question, that adoption of CG has contributed 
positively to bank performance in terms of shareholder returns. This might be interpreted 
that CG leads to well-run banks whose directors constantly contribute to strategy, making critical 
choices that lead to better performance.
7 RoE-eamings realised from use of shareholders’ funds, and shows a bank’s financial health and efficiency 




The table below provides a summary of the main themes that emerged from interviews 
with reference to research questions guiding the study.
Table 2: Summary of main themes on CG perceptions, practice and performance that 
emerged from interviews.
Research question Theme
How do bank executives perceive the 
process of corporate governance 
implementation?
a) Meaning of CG
b) Corporate Governance: A Foreign Concept?
c) Regulation and Governance
d) Corporate Governance and Performance 
Nexus
e) Board of Directors
How is corporate governance 
practised within Kenyan banks?
a) Board Governance
b) Influences from Global Stage
c) Audit
i. Internal Audit
ii. External Audit CG
iii. Compliance Audit
d) Shareholders
How does compliance with corporate 
governance guidelines impact on 
performance of banking industry in 
Kenya?
a) Going Concern Value




5.5Explanation o f  the Main Research Question
How do bank executives in Kenya practice corporate governance, and how does this 
impact on the banking industry’s performance?
While conducting the interviews, it emerged that CG is practiced along four broad lines 
within the Kenyan banking industry. First, the process of corporate governance begins with 
the board of directors. It was commonly agreed by all the interviewees that the board of 
directors as the apex organ within a banking institution, has the responsibility of 
maintaining appropriate CG structures and process. This includes constituting an 
independent and qualified board that would objectively interrogate the actions of the 
management. Therefore, in order to enhance the efficiency of the board of directors and 
ensure they perform their monitoring role effectively, the interviewees indicated that their 
banks send the board members on regular directors’ trainings and seminars, where they’re 
trained on current CG and strategic leadership skills. Next, two of the interviewees (CGP4 
and CGP7) mentioned that they have links internationally, which have shaped how they 
approach CG. Foreign banks approach to CG is to a great extent influenced by their group 
structures, while domestic banks with foreign business connections also approach CG 
differently compared to other domestic banks without foreign contacts. For instance, CGP4 
noted that their bank’s interaction with other foreign banks had compelled them to adopt 
appropriate CG structures in order to win the confidence of their foreign partners, “we 
partner with organisations outside the country ...which loan us funds to invest in the 
country ...what helps us to win their confidence is by having good governance ”. For CGP7, 
being a subsidiary of a multinational bank means that their bank has to observe the parent 
company’s group CG structure along with the Kenyan CG code, “...whenever we practice 
CG, we have to put into consideration not only those regulations that are enforced by the 
CBK but also those CG guidelines that have been laid down by our parent company... ”.
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Thirdly, the role of auditing was mentioned as another way in which CG is maintained 
within banking institutions in Kenya. This study established that the internal audit role 
plays a primary role in in the CG process. As narrated by CGP5, “...internal audit enables 
the interrogation o f management to see if  the deliverables assigned by the board have been 
achieved... ”. Interviewee CGP1 also noted that external audit function continues to 
support the process of CG within the Kenyan banking industry where banks’ financial 
accounts are verified for accuracy; “...external audit helps in in the CG process by 
assuring the bank shareholders that the financial accounts they are given are a true and 
fair representation o f their bank’s financial position... ”. Also, the interviewees noted that 
having a compliance unit within their bank structures has helped the institutions by 
ensuring that all laid down; group and other CG regulations are fully complied with, and in 
the process helped to foster good CG. As an example, CGP7 describes the importance of a 
compliance department as follows, “...we have an independent compliance department 
that ensures all the CG regulations that have been issued are complied with... ”.
Fourthly, this study has found that many bank executives view CG as a collective 
responsibility, and thus try to involve the shareholders in the CG process. Majority of the 
interviewees from the listed banks emphasized how they publish their banks’ annual 
reports in dual languages -  English and Swahili - to increase the comprehension of 
financial accounts even by the less educated shareholders, even though this is not required 
under the law. This has resulted in more enlightened shareholders who are able to ask more 
informed questions during the AGMs, “...publishing our annual reports in English and 
Swahili means even those local shareholders who cannot understand English are not left 
out... ” CGP6.
The impact of corporate governance on the banking industry’s performance was found to 
be manifested along four performance benchmarks. First, the value of CG as described by 
the interviewees is not only for improving financial performance, but also as an assurance
to shareholders that their investment will continue as a going concern in the future. Second, 
insights from this study show that CG plays a crucial role in checking the level of non­
performing loans portfolio which has resulted in better asset quality and improved 
profitability for the banking industry. This is evident in CGP4 response, “...in our CG 
structure we have a credit committee looking at the health o f our loan-book, and advising 
us on what to do when there are doubtful loans... ”. Another way, in which CG continues 
to foster the performance of banking institutions, is through capping on insider lending 
which had been the single largest cause of bank failure in Kenya was before: “...CG laws 
have capped borrowing by directors to 20% o f the core capital, meaning that the risk o f  
excessive insider lending has now been controlled... ” CGP2. Third, interviewees’ 
feedback showed that having the right mix of qualities and skills of members sitting on the 
board has helped their banks to strategize for long-term survival. The interviewees also 
noted that CG has helped to position their institutions competitively with lower costs and 
increased income; “ ...our board recommended the acquisition o f  ICT technology which 
has lowered our operating costs... ”. Fourth, through good strategic policies, many banks 
have been able to increase their base earnings by introducing new products such as mobile 
and agency banking, as well as expanding into neighbouring countries. This evidences 
shows how boards of directors can effectively perform their role of providing proper 






This chapter links the research objectives with the narrative interpretation of the research 
evidence. It also presents the conclusions reached regarding the research questions set in 
the introduction section of this study. Section one discusses the main findings of the 
research, while sections two and three present the implications and limitations of the 
study’s findings and research respectively.
6.1 Conclusions
After systematic review of extant literature, it emerged that prior quantitative research has 
not only presented mixed findings about the impact of CG on firm performance, but also 
very little investigation has been conducted within emerging economies (Tsamenyi and 
Uddin, 2008). Additionally, the research on CG of banks is also very minimal (Caprio et 
al., 2007). Thus, using the aforementioned observations as a starting point, this study 
purposed to fill these voids by carrying out an exploratory research on banking institutions 
in Africa using qualitative evidence from Kenya. Accordingly, the study’s central research 
question sought to examine how banking institutions practice CG in Kenya, together with 
how this impacts on their financial performance. To answer this question adequately, the 
researcher developed three research sub-questions to guide the investigation in achieving 
the goals of the research. The first research sub-question sought to determine how bank 
executives, as agents of shareowners, perceive the CG process. Related to the first sub­
question, the second research sub-question attempted to understand how CG is practiced 
within Kenyan banks. The third research sub-question presents and discusses how bank 
executives think of CG influence on the performance of banking industry in Kenya. The
sub-sections below elaborate on the findings that resulted from this MRes research project.
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6.1.1 Respondents’ Perceptions of Governance
Research question 1: How do bank executives perceive the process o f corporate 
governance implementation?
Being an exploratory research, this study’s fieldwork began inquiring from the 
interviewees about their definition and understanding of CG. Evidence from the research 
results established that CG is widely perceived as an instrument for control in the 
administration of banking business. This study thus supports Zulkafi and Samad’s (2007) 
argument that CG serves an important role in banking business, where government-backed 
regulation is supplemented by the added policing brought about by CG.
Whereas all banks are obligated to comply with some basic CG regulations, their approach 
to implementation vary, with publicly-listed banks using CG as an assurance to existing 
shareholders, as well as appeal to potential investors. Respondents from privately-owned 
banks on the other hand, viewed CG as a managerial handbook for the running of their 
banks. Privately-held banks also appear reluctant towards CG, considering it as a bother 
within their institutions, apparently likening its relevance to the publicly-listed banks rather 
than privately-owned banks. In line with Hagendorff et al. (2010), this finding indicates 
that effective CG within the Kenyan banking industry may only be realised through strict 
enforcement where CG mechanisms and bank regulation are taken as complementarities 
and not substitutes. This is because as the interviewees commonly indicated, CG is still in 
its nascent stages of development within the industry, and largely seen as a western 
solution to previous western problems. On this basis, a strict regulatory environment is best 
suited to continue promoting CG development within the banking industry, without which 
it appears CG would not thrive, as it was considered to lack an impetus of its own.
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Differing views also arose when interviewees were asked to account for their perceived 
link between CG and performance, with some maintaining that strong and direct tie exist, 
while others stated that a weak link existed. On reflection, it seems that Kenya being a 
rapidly growing economy, there may be many factors to explain the performance of 
banking institutions besides CG. For instance, it may be possible for banks to report 
improved profitability without deliberate strategy as argued for in agency theory, but as a 
result of increased revenue from growth in clientele base, since a large proportion of 
Kenyan populace is still unbanked. Therefore, without appearing dismissive of the value 
added by CG to bank performance, this study finds that it might be possible for banks 
without proper CG structures to outperform their well-governed peers if they probably 
have a small customer base, at least in the short-term. Nonetheless, banks that practice 
good CG would possibly outperform such banks in the longer-term and achieve sustained 
growth of their shareholders funds. This finding also implies that profitability may not be a 
suitable performance metric in assessing the impact of CG on firm performance within 
emerging markets.
Another salient finding was that banks have varying stimuli when filling board positions. 
In some banks and consistent with assumptions of agency perspective, board appointments 
are reserved for individuals who possess skills to strategically guide the banks in realising 
their objectives. Nevertheless, a section of interviewees viewed board appointments as an 
opportunity to establish good relations with the central government, particularly for foreign 
banks, as well as win business through links created by the new directors. The latter 
finding diverges from agency perspective, as markets can be turbulent within developing 
countries, due to political tensions thus necessitating bank directors to overcome this by 
liaising with the government in power. This finding agrees with Tsamenyi and Uddin’s 
(2008) work that, developing economies such as Kenya may be dynamic and problematic 
due to political and other considerations, and which if overlooked may undermine the
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effectiveness of CG systems. This study therefore recommends to practitioners and policy 
makers the need to consider underlying socio-political environment in Kenya in order to 
maximize the effectiveness of CG mechanisms within the banking industry (Adu-Amoah 
et al., 2008).
6.1.2 CG Process w ith in  B anking Institu tions in K enya 
Research question 2: How is corporate governance practiced within Kenyan banks?
Interestingly, respondents’ views about their definition of CG, replayed again while 
interpreting how CG is practiced within banking institutions. Consistent with assumptions 
of agency perspective, the board of directors as narrated continues to play an important 
role of monitoring the actions of management on behalf of the shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). For instance, the appointment of individuals who are risk management 
experts to chair board audit committees enables the board of directors to avoid economic 
risks and minimise financial loss. In addition, corresponding with Aboagye and Otieku 
(2010) discussion, this study finds continuous directors’ trainings as important feature in 
improving CG practice through enhanced governance competencies.
This study also demonstrated that the Anglo-American CG model lacks absolute 
congruence with local contextual arrangements. Whereas the model assumes CG problems 
between shareholders and management, it overlooks a serious aspect of principal-principal 
conflict, where minority shareholders risk exploitation by controlling shareholders (Chen 
et al., 2011). Furthermore, many banks were noted to be family-controlled implying 
potential for serious CG conflicts if the majority shareholders manipulate the CG process.
The audit function was mentioned as another way in which CG is enhanced, because of the 
disclosures, accountability and transparency involved in the process of auditing. The 
provision of assurance was considered essential in building trust with shareholders 
(Matama, 2008), and ensuring that insiders do not expropriate banks’ resources thus
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boosting a bank’s value (Zulkafli and Samad, 2007). This helps to reduce the likelihood of 
information asymmetry problem, where the management may possess more information 
regarding a bank’s affairs, and thus make it much easier for the shareholders to monitor the 
actions of management to avoid conflicts of interest.
Those banks that have links with international organisations, such as IMF and other 
international partners which lend their money through Kenyan banks were also mentioned 
as playing a leading role in development of CG within the banking sector (Okpara, 2011). 
It is apparent from the narrative that foreign banks, particularly the large multinational 
banks, have contributed immensely in the enhancement of CG standards by imparting 
‘good’ CG structures within the Kenyan banking industry.
The findings from this study also highlighted the increasingly important role performed by 
shareholders in maintaining ‘good’ CG within the banks. In a country that has a large 
segment of its population without formal education, one interviewee narrated that their 
bank publishes annual reports in two languages -  English and Swahili (local language) in 
order for their shareholders to benefit from information disclosed. This leads to more 
enlightened shareholders who are able to interrogate the directors impeccably during the 
AGMs. This way, these banks embrace the peculiarity of the local social context (Adu- 
Amoah et al., 2008; Tsamenyi and Uddin, 2008) by giving all shareholders, as principals, 
an opportunity to easily monitor the actions of their agents.
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6.1.3 Impact of Corporate Governance on Performance
Research question 3: How does compliance with corporate governance guidelines impact 
on performance o f banking industry in Kenya?
This study has established that CG is still developing and very much regulatory driven, 
where majority of the banking institutions implement mainly those CG provisions that are 
enforced by the regulators. Thus, in light of Hagendorff et al.’s (2010) findings, this study 
establishes that the Kenyan banking industry has immensely benefited from the 
enforcement of certain CG provisions by the CBK. For instance, all respondents 
acknowledged that not a single banking institution has collapsed since a decade ago, after 
the official adoption of CG within the industry. This therefore shows a huge contribution 
of CG within the banking industry, compared to the past where 16 banking institutions 
collapsed in one decade to 1996, due to insolvency associated with poor management. The 
findings from this study have also established that CG not only enhances financial 
performance, but also safeguards the going concern value of a bank for its owners. This 
study thus advances CG research noting that prior CG inquiry does not address the going- 
concem value of a firm, which is by far the true value of a firm, as other performance 
measures may be easily manipulated by management for their own selfish objectives.
This study nevertheless rejects Reaz and Arun’s (2006) argument that increased regulation
may adversely affect shareholder welfare, as contagion risk which is a serious threat to
banking business can only be eliminated through increased regulation which thus
complements CG (Macey and O’Hara, 2003; Zulkafli and Samad, 2007). ‘Good’ CG was
also found to have contributed to a reduction in non-performing loans portfolio, enhanced
the operating efficiency of the banking industry and consequently maximize the wealth of
the shareholders. In addition, while prior research has mainly used profitability, and, other
market and accounting measures to gauge performance; I contend that the paramount value
of ‘good’ CG within a developing economy such as Kenya is assurance to stockholders
71
that their investment will at the least remain going concern. This study further argues that 
in valuing a firm, other performance benchmarks are ancillary to going-concem value, as 
both local and foreign investors are attracted to firms that can weather the inevitable 
market turbulences present within many developing countries.
6.1.4 Conclusion
How do bank executives in Kenya practice corporate governance, and how does this 
impact on the banking industry’s performance?
Generally, the development of CG within the banking industry in Kenya can be attributed 
to two main factors: government regulation and foreign influence. Government regulation 
takes place where the CBK actively enforces certain CG provisions, such as the mandatory 
requirement for banks to have in place an audit and nomination committees, with the 
former being headed by a qualified finance and/or accounting professional. The CBK also 
stipulates that all bank boards must meet at least four times every year (Hagendorff et al., 
2010). Next, research insights indicate that foreign influence has also played a great role in 
the enhancement of CG within the Kenyan banking sector. This international inspiration 
occurs where local banks partner with other foreign banks, and are thus compelled to adopt 
certain CG structures in order to sustain their partnership with those institutions. The 
presence of foreign banks within the banking industry has also been found to embolden the 
adoption of CG by more local banks (Arun and Turner, 2004).
Additionally, there is evidence that CG players within the banking industry pay attention to 
the local institutional environment whenever they make some CG decisions (Adu-Amoah 
et al., 2008). A case is where all the listed banks targeted, confirmed that they publish their 
annual reports in both English as well as a local language -  Swahili. This is not a legal 
requirement but rather an adaptation technique to the local context, where a large number 
of people have low levels of educational attainments and the banks therefore try to make
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their financial accounts accessible to all their shareholders (Reaz and Arun, 2006; 
Tauringana et al., 2008).
A clear link between CG and bank financial performance was drawn by a number of 
respondents, who termed the discipline associated CG as having played a key role in 
cutting down on costs and consequently enhancing the financial performance of the 
banking industry (Matama 2008). Some of the ways in which CG has been found to boost 
the performance of the banking sector include the fact that more banks have by now better 
constituted boards, with more informed directors who are able to strategically guide their 
banks (Nyamongo and Temesgen, 2013). This is exhibited by the adoption of technology 
which has lowered the operating costs within the banking sector. As an instance, many 
banks have adopted other banking products such as mobile and agency banking, which has 
helped to expand their customer base and avoid the high costs associated with establishing 
new branches. Also, through good strategic steering, some banks have positioned 
themselves for future growth by establishing new branches in the neighbouring countries, 
thereby raising their revenues base.
Lastly, the requirement for banks to have in place credit committees has had a positive 
impact on the performance of the banking industry. It was clear that all bank boards have 
by now a functioning board credit sub-committee which frequently reviews their bank’s 
loan book, and are able to warn the management on time whenever there are signs that the 
bank is struggling with an accumulating non-performing loans portfolio. This is 
particularly important given that all previous banking crises in Kenya were attributed to 
imprudent lending practices (Waiguchu et al., 1999). The consequence of this has been a 
drastic reduction in the level of non-performing loans, for the entire banking industry thus 
translating to higher returns for the shareholders (ADB, 2007).
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6.2 Contribution of the Research
First, the study contributes to the scarce literature on CG of banks in Africa (Tsamenyi and 
Uddin, 2008; Wanyama et al., 2009). Second, this study also contributes to the 
development of CG inquiry through qualitative research by returning the call for more 
rigorous CG research (Zattoni, et al., 2013). Thirdly and pertaining to theory development, 
this research puts to question some of the assumptions underpinning the Anglo-Saxon CG 
model, as well as the agency theory. For instance, the potential for serious CG conflicts has 
been found to be more likely among principals, i.e. controlling and minority shareholders; 
as opposed to managers and shareholders since majority of the banks are privately owned. 
The research thus suggests that the Anglo-American CG model lacks congruence with the 
contextual background of Kenya, and would need to be customized to fit local institutional 
environment in order to enhance its effectiveness. Fourthly, there is also some evidence 
that banks which practice sustainability reporting have reduced information asymmetry 
between shareholders and executives, due to its associated high levels of transparency and 
disclosure, and therefore resulting in improved shareholder welfare within those banking 
institutions.
Likewise, this study’s findings have implications for policy. Firstly, the nature of banking 
business in Kenya, a developing country, is surrounded by imminent risks including 
political tensions, currency volatility and other macroeconomic shocks. It is therefore 
imperative for bank-owners to hire directors who understand risk so that they can 
effectively contribute to their banks strategy, and steer them to prosperity. Secondly, to 
ensure effectiveness of external audit in supporting the CG process, this research shows 
that two mandatory audits within banks may be beneficial -  interim (half-year) and final 
(end-year) audits. While final audit is a requirement for all banks, it was established that 
audit firms operate under a lot of duress and pressure, while conducting final year audits 
leaving them with very little time to give attention to fine details that may help to unearth
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serious issues. Thus, interim audit would give auditors an opportunity to identify things to 
spend more time on during the final audit. Thirdly, there is need for investors to be 
engaged in the CG process, and relevant authorities should actively involve shareholders in 
designing and review of CG guidelines. To achieve this and for shareholders to fully 
benefit from this process, there is need to re-establish an association/lobby which can 
protect their interests, empower and enlighten them on their rights, and directors duties 
within their banks. Fourthly, there is need to limit not only the age of individual directors 
but also the number of years a director can serve in one board consecutively. This would 
help to bring fresh mind-set and more innovative strategies and avoid retention of status 
quo, and improve the level of governance and board effectiveness within Kenyan banking 
industry.
6.3 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research
Although the researcher has attempted to follow requisite scientific procedures in carrying 
out this study, it suffers from some limitations. Firstly, this research has used a small 
sample size and is only representative of the banking industry in Kenya, and therefore 
lacks capacity to generalize its findings across any other African country. Future research 
may benefit from use of mixed methods where weaknesses within each methodology can 
be compensated for (Okpara, 2011). Secondly, the exclusive adoption of agency 
perspective which assumes that directors only monitor management and formulates 
strategy, makes the study oblivious of other important functions performed by boards, such 
as linking banks with potential customers. Future studies of this nature should adopt multi- 
theoretical perspectives in order to benefit from complementary views associated with 
multiple theories, and overcome limitations of individual theories (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). Thirdly, whilst present study adopted agency theory, which emphasizes that 
management are agents of shareholders (principals), it failed to include shareholders’ 
views on CG in the analysis. Future researchers should strive to incorporate data from
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shareholders to benefit from a complete picture. Fourthly, the respondents included 
participants who held different roles e.g. a CEO, head of finance, compliance manager, 
while others were risk and audit managers. Thus, the interview data may lack uniformity, 
as “respondents perspective about governance may be strongly influenced by the seat each 
holds” (Lorsch, 2012, p.87). Future studies should thus include input from a single role 
across their sample, or where this is not possible select more than one participant per 
institution. Lastly, due to scale and time constraints within which this MRes study was 
conducted, the findings reached are only suggestive but not conclusive evidence of the 
research problem. The ensuing PhD research has the benefit of time and scope plus 
resources, and will therefore offer a more definite argument of the research topic.
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Appendix 1 - Background o f Kenyan Banking Industry
Banks in Kenya are governed by the Companies Act (CAP. 486, Laws of Kenya), the 
Banking Act, (CAP. 488, in the Laws of Kenya) in addition to the Central Bank of Kenya 
Act (CAP. 491). The Central Bank of Kenya is the sole industry regulator.
Any individual holding a controlling-stake8 in any Kenyan bank must get clearance from 
the Central Bank of Kenya; and where such approval is refused that shareholder must give 
up voting rights and reduce the shareholding to a maximum of five per cent of the share 
capital within twelve months. This requirement emanated from an amendment to the 
Banking Act in 2009, after a parliamentary report noted that some prominent personalities 
had irregularly acquired huge loans, and then defaulted on repayment leading to collapse of 
a number of banks in the 1990s (Kenya National Assembly, 2009, p.39).
During the 1960s and 1970s, there were 10 banks which were mainly foreign-owned, and 
the financial sector experienced heavy government participation (Ngugi, and Kabubo, 
1998). Four of the banks -  two foreign and two government owned institutions -  held over 
80% and 50% of the banking industry’s deposit liabilities and total assets respectively. 
Furthermore, this quartet collusively turned the industry into an oligopoly9. Throughout 
this time, the government would cap interest-rates and dictate sectors to which banks 
would direct credit -  mainly agricultural, export, construction and manufacturing sectors; a 
move that was faulted for denying private sector the necessary credit, depressing savings 
mobilization and the eventual outward flight of capital (Ngugi, 2000).
8 A controlling/significant shareholder is an individual other than the government or public company who 
owns more than five per cent of share capital in a banking institution (Kenyan Banking Act., 2009).
9 Oligopoly -  refers to a market situation in which control over the supply of a commodity is held by a small 
number of producers each of whom is able to influence prices and thus affect the position of the competitors.
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Later in 1980s, in the wake of a seemingly ailing macroeconomic environment, the 
government deliberately lessened bank licensing requirements, as a way of encouraging 
more Kenyans to participate in the financial sector. This resulted to an increase in the 
number of banks to 23 in 1985 (Ngugi, and Kabubo, 1998). However, the low entry 
barriers were later criticized for the subsequent burgeoning of banks that were poorly 
managed and undercapitalized. This, coupled with inadequate supervision saw the financial 
sector reach the brink of failure in 1986, when 2 banks and associated non-banking 
financial institutions10 collapsed while many others endured severe liquidity problems.
In 1989, the government identified 9 troubled institutions that were bought out to form the 
government-owned Consolidated Bank of Kenya, while others underwent liquidation. 
These events led the government to considering other ways of shifting the financial 
sector’s over-reliance on the banking systems, and the Capital Market Authority was 
formed in 1990 in a bid to develop alternative sources of capital through long-term debt 
and equity markets (Ngugi, 2000).
Kenya has undergone two phases of banking sector breakdowns, with the bank failures of 
the 1980s mainly attributed to poor economic conditions (Ngugi, and Kabubo, 1998). 
Surprisingly, the costliest banking sector failure occurred in the 1990s after enactment of 
various financial sector reforms and amendment of the Banking Act when “Central Bank 
of Kenya lost an estimated 10.2 billion shillings (£78.4 Million) -  equivalent to 3.8 per 
cent of 1993 GDP -  from frauds involving political banks11 "(Brownbridge, 1998,p.l3). As 
Brownbridge observed, improper corporate governance practices including fraud and
10 Between 1974-79, commercial banks set up non-banking financial institutions as a way of circumventing 
stringent rules such as cash ratio and low capitalization requirements. In addition the non-banking institutions 
enjoyed higher interest rates while the banks were subjected to interest controls (Ngugi, 2001).
11 In early to mid-1990s, a number of Kenyan banks had prominent politicians dominating their boards, and 
were thus christened political banks (Economist Intelligence Unit, cited in Brownbridge, 1998).
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10excessive insider lending, excessive ownership and politician-managers were found to be 
the lead causes of the bank failures. Three years later in 1996, six more banks faced 
financial difficulties with five of them being placed under statutory management in 1998 
due to poor management, insider lending and undue political pressures (Ngugi, 2001). 
From 51 institutions in 1996, there are currently there are 43 banks in Kenya, with 10 of 
them operating subsidiaries in neighbouring countries of Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, 
Burundi and South Sudan, Malawi and Mauritius; with 125 of the 282 bank branches 
operating in Uganda. This is a growth of 59 subsidiaries from a total of 223 branches in 
2011 (Central Bank of Kenya, 2012). These past experiences and other issues will form the 
basis of this research in an attempt to understand how the banking industry in Kenya 
carries out corporate governance practices.
12 Politician-manager refers to a politically active individual who also served as a member of bank’s board of 
directors.
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Appendix 2 -  M ajor Provisions in the Kenyan Corporate Governance 
Guidelines
The corporate governance framework was developed in 2002, by the Capital Markets 
Authority, an independent regulatory agency that monitors and supervises the capital 
markets in Kenya. The code is assumes a ‘comply or explain’ stance, designed to allow 
‘flexibility and innovative approach to corporate governance practices’, although 
companies are required to disclose extent of non-compliance and specify steps taken to 
become compliant.
The main provisions contained within the code include: (Source: CMA, 2002).
• Board of Directors -every board ought to have at least an audit and nominating 
committee, with directors’ remuneration linked to performance and approved by 
shareholders. Boards should comprise at least one third executive directors, and 
multiple directorships are capped to five companies. Directors except CEO are required 
to stand re-election every three years.
• Separation of chairman and CEO roles -code requires a separation of chair and 
CEO roles, with multiple chairmanships limited to two companies.
• Shareholders -every company is required to hold an annual general meeting, wher 
shareholders can approve any major decisions in a company.
• Accountability and audit -the company’s accounts should be prepared according to 
International Accounting Standards, and inspected by independent auditors approved 
by the shareholders at every general meeting.
• Related-party disclosures -the board is expected to disclose all business related 
agreements entered into by related companies.
• Membership to professional organisations -the Chief Financial Officers, Company 
Secretary and company auditors of all listed companies are required to be members of 
internationally recognized professional bodies.
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Appendix 4 - Research Project Information and Consent Form
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Fax +44 (0) 1908 655 £ 
www.open.ac.uk/oubs
Research Project Information and Consent Form
Project Title
Governance of banking/financial institutions in Africa 
Name of the Researcher
Danson Kimani -  Master of Research Student (Business and Management). The Open University (UK). 
Purpose o f the Research
This research project is being undertaken as part of the MRes program, and is thus for academic 
purposes only. The main objective is to elicit a rich and deeper understanding from participants about 
their perceptions concerning the effectiveness of corporate governance regulations on the performance of 
commercial banks in Kenya. The data shall be collected using semi-structured interviews with senior bank 
managers as the primary research participants, together with detailed field observation notes.
Duration of the Interview
The duration of the interview is expected to last for approximately 45 minutes to one hour.
Benefits to the Participants
Whilst there are no immediate benefits for you as a participant in this project, it is hoped that this work will 
help to contribute to and encourage high quality research in the field of corporate governance and help to 
facilitate stimulating debate between practitioners, academics and policy makers, and in addition promote 
the implementation of best corporate governance standards. However, a summarised copy of the 
research report shall be provided to you for participating in the research process, once the final draft has 
been completed.
Risks to  the Participants
The research process involves minimal levels of risk, and as a participant therefore you will not encounter 
any risks that exceed those risks encountered in the day to day activities. In addition, the researcher is 
under strict obligation to protect the research participants from any type of psychological distress or 
physical risks.
The Open University is incorporated by Roya! 
Charter {RC 000391), an exem pt charity in Engls 








Risks to the Participants
The research process involves minimal levels o f risk, and as a participant therefore you will not 
encounter any risks that exceed those risks encountered in the day to day activities. In addition, the 
researcher is under strict obligation to protect the research participants from any type of 
psychological distress or physical risks.
Confidentiality and Data Protection
The researcher will take every possible precaution to uphold the confidentiality o f the research 
participants’ identities and data. The data collected from the participants will be used solely for 
research purposes and with their permission. If any participant does not agree to the use o f any 
piece o f the information provided by him/her for research purpose, such data will not be used. The 
interviews will be tape recorded and transcribed by the researcher later on. The researcher will also 
take all possible measures to protect the data collected from any unauthorised access, accidental 
disclosure, loss or destruction. The researcher shall keep the data under password protected storage. 
The audio data will be stored on the more secure Open University’s servers where it will be 
accessible to the researcher only. The data shall not be kept with the researcher longer than 
required, and will be destroyed once this research project is completed and the dissertation has been 
submitted to the research school. For the benefit o f participants, no personal information is required 
in writing or any other stage o f this research and thus, the names o f the participants and their 
institutions shall be kept confidential and will be coded and pseudonyms such as executive 1 or 
official 1 etc. shall be used to denote the individuals who participate in the research. Other 
pseudonyms such as Large public sector bank or Medium private sector bank shall also be used to 
denote the institutions. For purposes o f this research, the researcher shall dutifully adhere to the 
provisions contained in the Data Protection and Freedom of Information Act, The Open University 
Code o f Practice for Research and Those Conducting Research, the Ethics Principles for Research 
involving Human Participants, and the Economic and Social Research Council’s Framework for 
Research Ethics. Therefore, data protection and confidentiality shall be maintained in strict 
accordance with the guidelines detailed herewith. The results o f the data shall be disseminated in
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the form of dissertation report and, possibly as an article for presentation at an academic conference 
or for publication in an academic journal.
Costs and Compensation
This research project is fully-funded by The Open University (UK), and will be undertaken for the 
purpose o f completing the Master o f Research dissertation module. As a research participant 
therefore, you are not expected to bear any extra costs during the research process. The researcher 
shall approach the participant at his/her place o f work.
Voluntary Nature of Participation
Participation in the research process is voluntary and you have every right to decline participation. 
In case o f agreement to be a participant, you still have the right to withdraw participation before all 
the research data are analysed and final results are concluded.
Contact Details
In case o f any queries regarding this research project, please feel free to contact me or any o f my 
supervisors at The Open University.
Danson Kimani (Researcher)
Tel: U K +44 (0) 1908 858662 Kenya +254 (0)726 375970 E-mail:
Danson.Kimani@open.ac.uk
Dr. Devendra Kodwani (Lead Supervisor)
Tel: U K +44 (0) 1908 655859 E-mail:
dk2567@openmail.open.ac.uk
Dr. Howard Viney (Supervisor)




I____________________________________ have had the opportunity to read this information
and consent form, ask questions where necessary and agreed to participate in this research project. 
I have been informed about the purpose, duration, risks, and benefits of the project. I have also 
been assured about the confidentiality of the information, and that research data will be confidential 
to the extent allowed by law, and thus shall remain secure and only used for academic purposes 
including writing research article in an academic journal. I have also been informed that I have the 
right to withdraw from participation before all the research data are analysed and final results are 
concluded.
I understand that if I have any questions or concerns about this project, I can contact the researcher 




Appendix 5 - Letter o f Refusal o f Research Interview
RE: Request for an interview appointment 
Xxxx X. [Xxxx X@centralbank.go.ke]
Sent:l l  June 2013 06:02
r p
°* fDanson.Kimani' rDanson.Kimani@onen.ac.ukl 
Dear Danson,
Thanks for your email and the attachments which provide a clearer picture of your research. I have 
in particular reviewed the discussion questions. While this is a pertinent research, it would be 
difficult for I or my colleagues to provide responses to your questions. As CBK employees, the 
views we espouse are taken to represent the views of the Central Bank. In this regard, the views of 
the Central Bank as far as corporate governance in banks is concerned are codified in the Banking 
Act and the Prudential Guideline on Corporate Governance both of which can be downloaded from 
www.centralbank.go.ke I therefore regret that I am unable to be of further assistance to you but 
wish you well in your research endeavours.
Regards
XXXX XXXX [Identity anonymized]
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Appendix 6 - Interviewee Details
Interviewee Organisation Gender Professional Qualifications Experience
CGP1 Regulatory authority that 
developed the guidelines 
for good CG practices in 
Kenya
Female Bachelors degree 
Background: Market 
supervision, Investor 
Education and Public 
Awareness
7 Years
CGP2 Large publicly-listed 
domestic bank
Male Masters degree/ Certified 
Public Accountant 
Background: Head of Finance. 
Internal Audit
5 years
CGP3 Large private Pan-African 
bank
Male Masters degree/ 
ACCA/Certified Fraud 
Examiner
Background: risk, credit, 
compliance and audit.
8 years
CGP4 Large private domestic 
bank
Male Masters degree/ CPA/Certified 
Information Systems Auditor 
Background: Credit, risk, 
auditing
12 years
CGP5 Large foreign private 
bank




CGP6 Organisation that 
developed the first code 
of standards on CG in 
Kenya
Male Doctorate degree 
Background: CG training for 
Chairmen, Directors of 
Boards, Chief Executives, 
Senior managers
13 years
CGP7 Publicly Listed 
Multinational bank
Male Masters degree 
Background: Internal Audit. 
Systems audit, compliance, 
risk, Accounting and Audit 
trainer
10 years












Macey and O’Hara (2003); Reaz and Arun (2006); 
Zulkafli and Samad (2007); Andres and Vallelado
(2008); Hagendorff et al. (2010)
V.....................................   ^
Banking
Institutions
Adu-Amoah et al. (2008); Musikali (2008); 
Tsamenyi and Uddin (2008); Wanyama et al.
(2009); Okpara (2011)
King and Levine (1993); Arun and 
Turner (2004); Roe and Peachey 
(2008); Ngugi et al. (2009); Claessens 
and Yurtoglu (2012)
r
Waiguchu et al. (1999); ADB (2007); Matama 
(2008); Tsamenyi and Uddin (2008); Aboagye 
and Otieku (2010); Nyamongo and Tsemengen 
(2013)
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Appendix 8 -  Interview Schedule
Interview schedule for bank executives
a) How would you define corporate governance? Do you think the current corporate 
governance regulations operating in Kenya are meeting their intended objectives?
b) What are some of the initiatives that your bank has undertaken to comply with CG 
guidelines in Kenya?
c) Do banks need special corporate governance arrangements from those pertaining in 
other non-financial firms?
d) How would you define the relationship between corporate governance and bank 
performance in terms of profitability or other performance criteria?
e) Do you think that corporate governance is best left to the market forces, or is there a 
need for an active enforcement by the Central Bank, or any other regulatory 
authorities?
f) What do you consider to be the main factors that determine the structure and 
composition of bank boards in Kenya? Are age and gender considerations of 
relevance?
g) How would rate the implementation of the corporate governance code? Do you think 
that enforcement of corporate governance by the relevant authorities has been 
adequate?
h) What recommendations would you make to further improve the state of corporate 
governance in Kenya, particularly so within the banking industry?
Interview schedule for CMA respondent
a) What are your general views regarding the state of corporate governance in Kenya?
b) Is there a link between CG and bank financial performance?
c) Is CG best left to market forces or is there a need for intervention by the 
government/regulatory agencies?
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d) What do you consider to have been the main influences on the development of CG in 
Kenya?
e) Does compliance with CG guarantee effective management practices for the running of 
banks? Have you ever taken any actions as a result of non-compliance by some 
banking institutions?
f) What is the role of audit function in the Kenyan CG environment?
g) What do you consider to be the role of board? What do you think characterizes a good 
bank board?
h) What local and/or international organisations does CMA cooperate with in improving 
the regulatory framework for CG in Kenya?
i) Where do Shareholders come in when designing/revising the CG framework?
j) What is your opinion regarding the overall Kenyan shareholder community?
Interview schedule for CCG respondent
a) What are your general observations regarding the state of corporate governance in the 
Kenyan banking sector?
b) Do you think there is a link between corporate governance and bank performance in 
terms of profitability or any other performance criteria?
c) Do you think that corporate governance is best left to interaction of market forces, or is 
there a need for intervention by government/regulatory agencies?
d) Are the current CG regulations operating in Kenya meeting their intended objectives?
e) Do banks need different CG arrangements from the non-financial entities?
f) How effective is the CG framework in Kenya? Do you consider its implementation and 
enforcement to be adequate?
g) What do you consider to have been the main influences on the development of CG in 
Kenya?
h) What recommendations would you make to further improve CG within Kenyan 
banking industry?
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Appendix 9 -  Fram ework followed in the coding process
Themes Categories Code
Perception of corporate 
governance (PCG)
Meaning of CG (M) PCG-M
CG: A foreign concept? (F) PCG-F
Regulation and governance (R) PCG-R
CG and performance nexus (P) PCG-P
Board of directors (BoD) PCG-BoD
Implementation of corporate 
governance (ICG)
Board governance (BG) ICG-BG





CG impact on financial 
performance (FP)
Going concern value (GC) BFP-GC
Reduced non-performing loans 
portfolio (NPL)
FP-NPL
Cost efficiency (CE) FP-CE
Earnings (E) FP-E
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